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Joshua Wilner*

Service to the Nation: A Living Legal Value
for Justice Lawyers in Canada**

Lawyers working within a living government require a living ethics, an approach to
ethics that accounts for their day-to-day professional lives within the Department
of Justice Canada. There are different archetypes of Justice lawyers, and thus a
living ethics is also an ethics of place, one which is sensitive to the government
institutions within and for which lawyers work and the functions they accomplish.
The focus of this paper, which employs a virtue ethics methodology, is primarily
civil litigators.
Distinguishing between values (enduring beliefs that influence action) and
ethics (the application of values in practice), the paper proposes "service to the
nation" as a value that all Justice lawyers share, and describes how that value
grows into an ethics that is specific to Justice civil litigators. Service to the nation
comprises in its very fabric a conception of public service which, in turn, requires
an investigation of who Justice lawyers' clients are and how the lawyers' public
interest mandate informs their professional lives.
In the language of virtue ethics, "service to the nation" is the "characteristic
function" common to all Justice lawyers. Virtue ethics teaches that the ethical
practice of a lawyer can be facilitated through developing professional mentorship
relationships with virtuous people. Both rules and roles provide ethical direction,
but it is role models, not rules in professional codes of conduct, that are the focal
point of ethical deliberation.
Les avocats qui travaillent au sein d'un gouvernement vivant ont besoin d'une
6thique vivante, dthique qui s'applique dans leurs activit6s professionnelles
quotidiennes . I'interieurdu ministere canadien de la Justice. II existe diff6rents
archetypes d'avocats au sein du Minist~re. Ainsi, une 6thique de vie est 6galement
une dthique de lieu, 6thique sensible aux institutions gouvernementales oci les
avocats travaillent et aux fonctions qu'ils renplissent. L'accent de cet article,
qui emploie une methodologie d'6thique de la vertu, est principalement sur les
avocats qui pratiquent en litige civile.
Faisant la distinction entre les valeurs (convictions profondes qui influent sur les
actions) et 1'6thique (application des valeurs dans la pratique), I'auteurpropose,
au service de la nation " comme valeur partag6e par tous les avocats de Justice
Canada; il d6crit comment cette valeur donne naissance a une 6thique particuliere
aux avocats qui pratiquent en litige civile. Le service 6 la nation comporte, dans
son essence meme, le concept de fonction publique. Ce point, 6 son tour, exige
que 'on s'interroge sur la nature des clients des avocats de Justice Canada
et sur la fagon dont leur mandat en mati~re d'int6ret public influe sur leur vie
professionnelle.
Dans la langue de I'6thique de la vertu, , service a la nation " est la fonction
caract6ristique commune a tous les avocats du Minist~re. L'ethique de la vertu
enseigne que la pratique 6thique d'un avocat peut 6tre facilitde s'il noue des
liens de mentorat professionnel avec des personnes vertueuses. Les r~gles et les
roles donnent une orientation dthique, mais ce sont les personnes qui donnent
I'exemple et non les r~gles 6noncues dans les codes de conduite professionnelle
qui sont au centre des deliberations 6thiques.
* B.A. (Hons.) Economics and Philosophy, McGill University, 2005; B.C.L./LL.B. McGill
University, 2009; Student-at-Law, Department of Justice Canada, Ontario Regional Office, 20092010; clerk to the Honourable Mr. Justice Robert Mainville, Federal Court of Canada, 2010-2011.
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"Service to the nation provides me with a philosophy of work."
F.R. Scott, journal, 26 June 1924.
Introduction
Lawyers working within a "living government"' require a living ethics.
My goal is to develop the beginnings of an account of legal ethics rooted
in the lived experience of government lawyering,2 a theory that accounts
for the day-to-day realities of legal practice in the federal government,
with a particular (though not exclusive) focus on civil litigation lawyers
practising at the federal Department of Justice (DoJ). Public sector legal
ethics has not received a great deal of attention in Canada-with some
notable exceptions 3-and a lot more work remains to be done.

1. Eugene A. Forsey, How CanadiansGovern Themselves, 6th ed. (Canada: Library of Parliament,
2005) at 49 [Forsey].
2.
Here I borrow by analogy from Lome Sossin's description of John Willis's functionalist view
of administrative law: "From Neutrality to Compassion: The Place of Civil Service Values and Legal
Norms in the Exercise of Administrative Discretion" (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 427 at 427 [Sossin, "From
Neutrality to Compassion"].
Some core articles include Allan C. Hutchinson, "'In the Public Interest': The Responsibilities
3.
and Rights of Government Lawyers" (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 105; Deborah MacNair, "The Role of
the Federal Public Sector Lawyer: From Polyester to Silk" (2001) 50 U.N.B.L.J. 125 [MacNair, "From
Polyester to Silk"]; "Solicitor-Client Privilege and the Crown: When Is a Privilege a Privilege?" (2003)
82 Can. Bar Rev. 213; "In the Service of the Crown: Are Ethical Obligations Different for Government
Counsel" (2005) 84 Can. Bar Rev. 501 [MacNair, "In the Service of the Crown"]; John C. Tait, "The
Public Service Lawyer, Service to the Client and the Rule of Law" (1997) 23 Commonwealth L. Bull.
542 [Tait].
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The emphasis throughout is on applied ethics-ethics as lived (the
deed) as opposed to as read (the word). Ethics is about implementing
abstract values-enduring beliefs that influence action-in concrete
circumstances of decision-making. Ethics is about operationalizing values
in lived practices.4 I propose service to the nationas a living legal value
for DoJ lawyers and demonstrate how it grows into an ethics of placethat of civil litigation practice in the federal government.5
The centrality in this essay of the idea of "life," and the frequent use
of its cognates "alive," "living" and "lived," is meant to point to two basic
premises concerning legal ethics: first, legal ethics is not so much about
rules as it is about people; and second, once legal ethics as a discipline
devotes more attention to the daily lives of practising lawyers, it may be
difficult to sustain the traditional view that law and ethics are completely
distinct. It is people themselves who personify these ambiguities, since
their lives cannot be separated into bright-line normative compartments.
Francis Reginald Scott, a young teacher at Lower Canada College
in Montreal, having just returned from completing his B.Litt. at Oxford,
wrote in his journal in 1924, "Service to the nation provides me with
a philosophy of work." 6 With this resolution he decided to take up the
profession of law, with its promise of political public service, and enrolled
at McGill University.7 From this private, personal communication I derive
the guiding principle of this essay, the bedrock value that runs through the
distinctive issues in legal ethics faced by government lawyers. What is the
nation? What are the dimensions of service, particularly public service?
How can, and should, government lawyers serve the nation?
The analysis throughout is animated by two additional fundamental
premises of a living legal ethics for government lawyers. First, concrete
action is influenced more by values and aspirations (including role models,

4.
See A Strong Foundation:Report of the Task Forceon Public Service Values and Ethics (Ottawa:
Canadian Centre for Management Development, 1996, reprinted with dedication 2000) (Chair: John
C. Tait, Q.C.) at 4 (differentiating between public service values and public service ethics), online:
Canadian School of Public Service <http://www.csps-efpc.gc.ca/pdp/pub/pdfs/ pgle.pdf> [Tait
Report].
5.
1do iottake the position that there are no other values that DoJ lawyers share, only that service
to the nation is an important one among them. Put differently, service to the nation is an end that is
susceptible of multiple meanings in multiple contexts. It will always be a matter of contention just
what service to the nation entails for a DoJ lawyer. As Fuller reminds us, "It is characteristic of normal
human beings that they pursue a plurality of ends; an obsessive concern for some single end can in fact
be taken as a symptom of mental disease." (Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1964) at 18 [Fuller].)
6.
Sandra Djwa, The Politics of the Imagination:A Life of ER. Scott (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1987) at 72.
7.
Ibid.
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who are aspirations "in the flesh") than by rules (such as those found in
codes of conduct). That formal rules will always fall short of being able to
capture, contain, define and control human action, however, does not mean
that there is no place for them. It simply means that prohibitions coupled
with penalties do not facilitate the full normative potential of human
imagination and agency.8 No set of rules can fully capture the subtlety and
ambiguity of everyday life. That is why legislative solutions to ethical issues
are often inadequate by themselves. Second, ethics cannot be divorced
from place. To act ethically is to know one ' place, an expression which
can be unpacked in various ways: it points to (i) the individual's personal
characteristics and temperament; (ii) the specific factual situation in which
one finds oneself; (iii) the specific government agency, department or office
in which a lawyer works (which also determines the lawyer's roles and
functions, the lawyer's "role morality"9 ), and (iv) the lawyer's position
within the larger state structure of Canada's constitutional democracy.10
It is the idea of a role model that leads me to attempt to renew the
preoccupation with virtue," a concept that has not received adequate
treatment to date in the literature on Canadian legal ethics, 2 largely
because of a prevailing view of legal ethics as being about lawyer's rules
instead of about people and their interpersonal relationships. In a major
survey article reviewing the historical "waves" of ethics scholarship and
also looking towards future doctrinal tides, the word virtue is noticeably
absent.'3 Virtue ethics teaches that the ethical practice of a lawyer can be
8.
Fuller, supra note 5 at c.1.
9.
See David M. Tanovich, "Law's Ambition and the Reconstruction of Role Morality in Canada"
(2005) 28 Dal. L.J. 267, defining "role morality," at 274-75, as "the set of norms, standards, and values
that govern the conduct of individuals when acting as lawyers. It is the profession's 'professional
conscience."'
10. As this unpacking of the word place demonstrates, I am concerned here with how the DoJ
lawyer's physical environment affects her ethics. One's office also points to a role, which invariably
points towards role models (see note immediately below and accompanying text).
11. See eig. G.E.M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958) 33 Philosophy 1;Marcia
Baron, "Varieties of Ethics of Virtue" (1985) 22 American Philosophical Quarterly 47; Philippa Foot,
Virtues and Vices and OtherEssays in Moral Philosophy(Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1978); Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of
Notre Dame Press, 2007) [Maclntyre]; Martha Nussbaum, "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian
Approach" in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr. & Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Characterand
Virtue, Midwest Studies in Philosophy(Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) 12;
Michael Slote, From Morality to Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Michael Slote,
Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); James Wallace, Virtues and Vices (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978).
12. But see Michael Milde, "Legal Ethics: Why Aristotle Might Be Helpful" (2002) 33 Journal of
Social Philosophy 45; Alice Woolley, "Tending the Bar: The 'Good Character' Requirement for Law
Society Admission" (2007) 30 Dal. L.J. 27.
13. Adam M. Dodek, "Canadian Legal Ethics: Ready for the Twenty-First Century at Last" (2008)
46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
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facilitated through developing professional mentorship relationships with
virtuous people.
I. Demographicsand characteristicsofpublic sector lawyers
There are presently no reliable statistics -on how many public sector
lawyers are currently practising in Canada, although in 1996 there were
approximately 10,000.14 In the DoJ specifically there were forty-two
lawyers in 1962, 250 in 1971, 1,200 in 1997, and almost 1,800 in 2000."
It is clear from the numbers that federal government lawyers are in high
demand. Indeed, it has been compellingly argued that the DoJ is now the
central actor in the Government of Canada. 16The increases in DoJ lawyers
between 1997 and 2000 are all the more significant in light of the serious
contraction in the overall size of the federal public service from 1995
through 1999, during which time the total number of federal employees
diminished from 382,000 to 326,500 (a seventeen percent reduction). 7
The demographics tell only a small part of the story. Describing, in
addition, the institutional context in which public sector lawyers work will
help in building the ethics of place already described in the Introduction.
A living ethics for government lawyers should grow from their everyday
legal practice. A model developed in isolation from professional reality
will have little explanatory, descriptive, or prescriptive power.
. The functions and roles of government lawyers will, in large part,
be determined by the institutional context-the agency, department or
office-in which a lawyer works. Institutions should not be assumed away
as "black boxes," as they are normally considered, for example, in classical
economics. Professional structures are of profound ethical significance. 8
Deborah MacNair, Corporate Counsel with the DoJ in Ottawa, outlines
five examples of Justice lawyers-Crown prosecutor, legislative drafter,

14. MacNair, "From Polyester to Silk," supra note 3 at 125, n. 2, citing "Calling all public sector
lawyers" The National 5:3 (May 1996) 38.
15. Ibid. at 137; Tait, supra note 3 at 545.
16. James B. Kelly, "Bureaucratic Activism and the CharterofRights and Freedoms:The Department
of Justice and Its Entry into the Centre of Government" (1999) 42 Canadian Public Administration
476. Because there is a distinction between the role of the DoJ lawyer, as a person, and the role of the
DoJ proper, as an institution, the author's argument that the DoJ is now an executive support-agency
can be reconciled with the view that the DoJ is more than merely the "government's lawyer." See infra
note 24 and accompanying text.
17. Katarzyna Naczk, Employment Trends in the Federal Public Service (Ottawa: Minister of
Industry, 2007), online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.ca/english/research/l1-621-MIE/lI621 -MIE2007053.htm>.
18. H. Patrick Glenn, "Professional Structures and Professional Ethics" (1990) 35 McGill L.J. 424
(noting at 427 that in Germany "one does not speak of legal ethics or deontology but of Standesrecht,
the law defining one's place (where one stands) or role, since it is one's role which defines the standards

of conduct one must meet.") [Glenn].
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legal advisor, policy lawyer, and civil litigator. 9 These archetypes serve as
a helpful typology for the purposes of fleshing out future ethics of places.
The focus of this paper is primarily civil litigators. Service to the nation
will invariably mean different things in different institutional contexts,
and therefore a one-size-fits-all approach to the professional ethics of
government lawyers may be inadequate. Still, some unity of approach is
possible, a corporate cohesion that service to the nation is meant to stand
for. Any unifying (centripetal) forces must always remain sensitive to the
fragmenting (centrifugal) forces that tend to disintegrate the analysis.
A notable characteristic of federal government lawyers, which serves
to unite them, is that they all wear multiple "hats" at once.20 They are
not only public servants and salaried employees of the Crown, but also
lawyers, each one of whom, as a condition of employment, must be a
member of a law society. As employees they have been unionized since
April 2006, are paid with monies from the Consolidated Revenue Fund
(the treasury), and are subject to the Public Service Employment Act 2
and the Public Service Labour Relations Act. 22 Crown lawyers are not
employed by the departments within which they work; they are agents of
the Attorney General.of Canada.
As lawyers they are not only subject to the disciplinary oversight of
their provincial law society, but also have unique duties, in their capacity
as agents of the Attorney General, to serve as guardians of the rule of law,
keep a constant focus on the public interest, fulfill their statutory duties,
and be faithful to their "higher duty" to the Canadian constitution.2 3 The
consensus seems to be that the Attorney General's duty to the constitution
includes the discretion to concede the unconstitutionality of a statute, which
24
suggests that the Attorney General is not just the "government's lawyer."
She is, in fact, the Crown 's lawyer, despite the uncomfortable fact that the
19. MacNair, "From Polyester to Silk," supra note 3 at 145-154. Since December 2006, all federal
Crown prosecutors have been employed by the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, which is an
independent organization reporting to Parliament through the Attorney General of Canada. The Public
Prosecution Service of Canada is technically not part of the DoJ.
20. For a more detailed account of much of what is described in this paragraph, see MacNair, "From
Polyester to Silk," supra note 3 at 139-140, 144, 165; MacNair, "In the Service of the Crown," supra
note 3 at 506.
21. S.C. 2003, c. 22, ss. 12, 13.
22. S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2.
23. Tait, supra note 3 at 543, 548. ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. II.
24. See Kent Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer: The Attorney General as Defender of
the Rule of Law" (2006) 31 Queen's L.J. 598 (Q.L.) [Roach]; Debra M. McAllister, "The Attorney
General's Role as Guardian of the Public Interest in Charter Litigation" (2002) 21 Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. 47; Lori Sterling & Heather Mackay, "The Independence of the Attorney General in the
Civil Law Sphere" (2009) 34 Queen's L.J. 891 at paras. 32-40 (Q.L.).
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Crown is less a corporeal entity than it is a concept floating about in the
monarchical ether. Although Crown lawyers are advocates, they neither
win nor lose their cases, but instead are meant to ensure that justice is
done.25 Section 5(a) of the Department ofJustice Act 26 has generally been
understood to mean that the Attorney General, and of necessity her agents,
must safeguard the public interest.27
As public servants DoJ lawyers are governed by the Values and
Ethics Code for the Public Service2 8 and the Conflict of Interest and PostEmployment Code for Public Office Holders.2 9 They are also subject to
security clearance checks as a condition of employment, and must swear
an oath of loyalty.3" Public servants' functions are constrained by, and
benefit from, an "iron triangle" of constitutional conventions, namely,
political neutrality, ministerial responsibility, and anonymity.3 The Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service forms part
of the conditions of employment.3 2 This code was created from the
recommendations of the so-called Tait Report,33 which described,
inductively and from the bottom-up, four families of public sector values
(democratic, professional, ethical, and people values). In her dedication
honouring the late John Tait, the former Clerk of the Privy Council,

25. Boucher v.The Queen,[1955] S.C.R. 16.
26. R.S.C. 1985, c. J-2.
27. McAllister, supra note 24 at 48. Section 5(a) states that the Attorney General of Canada "is
entrusted with the powers and charged with the duties that belong to the office of the Attorney General
of England by law or usage, in so far as those powers and duties are applicable to Canada, and also
with the powers and duties that, by the laws of the several provinces, belonged to the office of attorney
general of each province up to the time when the ConstitutionAct, 1867, came into effect, in so far as
those laws under the provisions of the said Act are to be administered and carried into effect by the
Government of Canada."
28. (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2003) [Values and Ethics Code],
online: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubspol/ hrpubs/TB_851/
dwnld/vec-cve-eng.pdf>.
29. (2006), online: Government of Canada <http://pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/code-e.pdf>.
30. See Public Service Employment Act, supra note 21, s. 54: "A person appointed or deployed
from outside that part of the public service to which the Commission has exclusive authority to
make appointments shall take and subscribe an oath or solemn affirmation in the following form:
...................
swear
..(or solemnly affirm) that I will faithfully and honestly fulfil the duties that
devolve on me by reason of my employment in the public service of Canada and that I will not, without
due authority, disclose or make known any matter that comes to my knowledge by reason of such
employment. (Add, in the case where an oath is taken, "So help me God" (or name of deity).)"
31. Geoffrey Marshall, ConstitutionalConventions: The Rules and Forms of PoliticalAccountability
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) at 210, cited in Lorne Sossin, Defining Boundaries: The
ConstitutionalArgumentfor BureaucraticIndependence and Its Implicationsfor the Accountabilityof
the Public Service at 32, online: Government of Canada - Depository Services Program <http://dsppsd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/Gomeryll/ResearchStudies2/ CISPAAVol2_2.pdf>.
32. Values and Ethics Code, supra note 28 at 12.
33. Supra note 4.
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Jocelyne Bourgon, describes these values as "living truths."34 As is noted
in the Tait Report itself, "abstract statements are less powerful than living
models and broadly shared practices, and are relatively powerless where
35
these do not exist.Having set out some basic characteristics of government lawyers, and
specifically DoJ lawyers, I now move to a wider discussion of DoJ lawyers
within the Canadian context.
II. The Crown and service to the nation
1. The Crown
To continue to develop the ethics of place described in the Introduction, we
must understand the DoJ lawyer's position within the larger state structure
of Canada's constitutional democracy. To serve one's country one must
know one's country, and a discussion of law officers of the Crown cannot
proceed without an understanding of what the Crown itself is. We must let
36
in daylight upon the magic of the Crown.
According to Queen Elizabeth II, the Crown is "an idea more than
a person ... '3s Technically, the Canadian Crown includes all executive
powers exercised by Her Majesty the Queen or on Her behalf by the
Governor General and Lieutenant Governors.38 And yet, although the
Queen is the embodiment of the Crown, she is not the Crown itself.
The Crown is technically an institution, not a person, which safeguards
the exercise of power on behalf of all citizens,3 9 uniting the legislative,
executive and judicial functions of government, 40 as well as uniting the
provinces and territories with the federal government. The Crown, simply
put, is a convenient symbol for the state and the nation.'
What, if any, are the practical consequences of being a law officer
of the Crown? What does this mean in the daily lives of practising DoJ

34. Ibid.ativ.
35. Ibid.at 60 [emphasis added].
36. Being of the view that the mystery of the Crown was its life, Walter Bagehot, businessman,
journalist, lawyer and constitutional theorist, counselled against doing so in 1882: The English
Constitution (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co, 1882) at 59.
37. Kevin S. MacLeod, A Crown of Maples: Constitutional Monarchy in Canada (Ottawa:
Department of Canadian Heritage, 2008) at 62, online: Department of Canadian Heritage - Ceremonial
and Canadian Symbols Promotion <http://www.patrimoinecanadian.gc.ca/pgm/ceem-cced/fr-rf/
csnCdn/csn_mpls-eng.pdf> [MacLeod].
38. Ibid., Appendix at XII.
39. Ibid. at 16.
40. Ibid. at 17.
41. Peter Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw ofCanada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007) at 10-2;
Law Reform Commission of Canada, The Legal Status of The FederalAdministration(Working Paper
40) (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1985) at 25.
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lawyers? Civil litigation lawyers at the DoJ are not concerned in their dayto-day practices with abstruse political theory. What they are concerned
about, throughout the hectic routines of litigation, is advocating for,
protecting and defending Canada's interests. On the assumption, which I
take to be uncontroversial, that determining the best interests of Canada
in any given case is itself a difficult process, we are left with the plain fact
that the lived experience of DoJ lawyering is replete, if only subtly so,
with philosophical questions about what service to the nation means.42
To move, then, from the descriptive to the prescriptive: to be able to
give real shape to his or her role in a particular circumstance, to implement
values in ethical decision-making, a DoJ lawyer should be able to think
philosophically. As Fritz Morstein Marx observed in 1946, government
' 43
lawyers must be "clear-headed philosophers of democratic governance.
Combined with this philosophical outlook should be a deep understanding
of the Canadian state and the living institutions that comprise it.44 But
these two qualifications are not enough. DoJ lawyers must be more than
thinkers who know who and what they work for; they must also be doers,
people who exercise practical wisdom (that is, judgment).
2. The nation
Many of the problems associated with DoJ lawyers being employees of
the Crown parallel those inherent in the value of service to the nation, for
nation too is an idea which does not have a final, concrete embodiment. That
weakness is also its strength. It is precisely the problematic connotations
of nation that will keep DoJ lawyers attuned to the difficulty of their tasks,

42. It should be noted that government lawyers do not have a monopoly on the representation of
abstract entities and the public interest. The private bar is often faced with similar problems, though
I would argue to a lesser extent than government lawyers. It is common for private litigants to sue
on behalf of others, not simply to vindicate their own rights simpliciter. Conservation societies,
amici curiae and church lawyers, to name just a few, are all faced with representing abstract entities:
see Louis L. Jaffe, "The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological
Plaintiff" (1967-1968) 116 U. Pa. L. Rev.1033 (invoking the concept, at 1035, of a "privateAttorney
General") [my emphasis]. See also Binnie J. (dissenting) in Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v.
Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), 2007 SCC 2, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 38 at para. 130, and
for the Court in Juman v. Doucette, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 157 at para. 43.
43. "The essence of the basic qualifications desirable in the government lawyer can be stated readily.
He should be a trustworthy source of legal counsel; that implies sound professional training in the law.
More distinctively, he should have a sure touch in the fine art of human and institutional relationships.
And finally, in his nearest approximation of the ideal, he should be what is best described as a clearheaded philosopher of democratic governance, quietly effective within the institutional framework of
public administration." Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Lawyer's Role in Public Administration" (19451946) 55 Yale L.J. 498 at 513 [Fritz Morstein Marx].
44. For a parallel argument for a situated ethics of place in the context of the structure of the
American government, see Geoffrey P.Miller, "Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks
and Balances" (1987) 54 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1293.
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the contested nature of their roles, and the questions inherent in their
functions.45 Ethical deliberation requires a perceptual sense that has an
inherently affective dimension to it: being good does not only involve doing
good, but also having a certain kind of disposition, an ability to engage
emotionally in a situation-though without surrendering judgment to utter
Dionysian madness. Judgment involves a combination of sympathy and
detachment. A consensus in the field of neurobiology is emerging which
suggests that moral thinking is inherently affective and intuitionist. 46 The
problematic connotations of nation-the fact that it is a contested idea and
as much a thing to be felt than to be characterized objectively-will allow
DoJ lawyers to remain sensitive to the everyday challenges of moving
from values to ethics, of applying the spirit of service to the practice of
service.
In imagining the nation, we serve it. It would be going too far to
say that the path itself becomes the destination, but it is likewise not
going far enough to assert that "a celebration of indeterminacy may be
an appropriate philosophy for some scholars, but it is not an appropriate
one for a law officer of the Crown."47 Indeterminacy is compatible with
decision-making. So long as in deciding one remains sensitive to the
problems that plague the decision, those very problems are celebrated.
They are not overcome through taking action, but instead are reaffirmed
as problems, and left to be struggled with another day. Constructing a false
sense of precision in the face of the inexorable necessity to decide would
be equally inappropriate. The indeterminacy of the government lawyer's

45. Service to the nation, of course, conjures up the spectre of nationalism. Below, I discuss the
importance for the DoJ lawyer of patriotism,which I hope to demonstrate is not a distinction without
a difference.
46. Oliver R. Goodenough & Kristin Prehn, "A Neuroscientific Approach to Normative Judgment
in Law and Justice" in S. Zeki & 0. Goodenough, eds., Law and the Brain (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004) 77; Alan M. Lerner, "Using Our Brains: What Cognitive Science and Social
Psychology Teach Us About Teaching Law Students To Make Ethical, Professionally Responsible,
Choices" (2004-2005) 23 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 643; J.D. Greene et al., "The neural bases of cognitive
conflict and control in moral judgment" (2004) 44 Neuron 389; J.D. Greene, "From neural 'is' to
moral 'ought': what are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology?" (2003) 4 Nature
Reviews Neuroscience 847; J.D. Greene & J. Haidt, "How (and where) does moral judgment work?"
(2002) 6 Trends in Cognitive Sciences 517; J.D. Greene et aL, "An fMRI investigation of emotional
engagement in moral judgment" (2001) 293 Science 2105. None of this is new in the judicial arena:
Joseph C. Hutchinson, Jr., "The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial Decision"
(1928-1929) 14 Cornell L.Q. 274.
47. Roach, supra note 24 at para. 43.
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client and the lawyer's public interest mandate is an everyday lived reality
48
of public sector practice. It would be a mistake to forget this.
In describing the beginnings of Canada in 1867, Eugene Forsey
writes: "Forthe nation, there was a Parliament, with a Governor General
representing the Queen; an appointed Upper House, the Senate; and an
elected Lower House, the House of Commons."49 That is the institutional
structure of government that serves (is "for") the nation, but what is the
nation? Forsey continues:
The word "confederation" is sometimes used to mean a league of
independent states, like the United States from 1776 to 1789. But for
our Fathers of Confederation, the term emphatically did not mean that.
French-speaking and English-speaking alike, they said plainly and
repeatedly that they were founding "a new nation," '.'a new political
nationality," "a powerful nation, to take its place among the nations of
the world," "a single great power."

They were very insistent on maintaining the identity, the special culture
and the special institutions of each of the federating provinces or
colonies5 0
The friction that lies at the heart of Canada is the same tension exemplified
in the principle of federalism: it is not a league of independent states but
a single state, and yet a single state that maintains the special cultures and
institutions of its component parts. Canada is a society built from.the unity
of difference, a "political nationality"'" to use Sir George-Etienne Cartier's
famous words, that is committed to an ethos of difference and grows- from
the fertile opportunity for deep disagreement that is our very togetherness.
It was the distinctively federal soils of Canada-the place-into which
the unitary British parliamentary-Westminster tradition was transplanted
that has allowed our living government, to say nothing of our living tree,

48. Reed Elizabeth Loder, "Tighter Rules of Professional Conduct: Saltwater to Thirst?" (1988) 1
Geo. J.Legal Ethics 311 at 337 puts the point brilliantly: "We should not bury theoretical complexity
in a fervent search for practical solutions-to persistently difficult moral problems which happen to
reappear in lawyers' clothing."
49. Forsey, supranote I at 3 [my emphasis].
50. Ibid at 7. Devotion to the Crown was the one element that all the Fathers of Confederation
shared: see Seymour Martin Lipset, Contintental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United
States and Canada (New York: Routledge, 1990) at 43.
51. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at para. 43.
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to grow into the uniquely Canadian organism that it is today.2 Successful
federations require and encourage multiple identities and loyalties, and
Canadians have a "deep and abiding sense of place."53
To make more explicit what is already entailed by my appropriation
of nation as the end which DoJ lawyers should serve, I should make clear
that I am advocating that DoJ lawyers should personify a qualified and
characteristically Canadian version of patriotism.54 Service to the nation
requires "love or devotion to one's country." To be patriotic is to be
"marked by devotion to the well-being or interests of one's country."5 5
That is an essential part of the job description of a DoJ lawyer.
It is the crudest form of nationalism that usurps the idea of shared
commitments for the purpose of asserting homogeneity as the basis of a
nation. Nationhood is not an ethnodemographic or ethnocultural fact; it is
more properly a political claim on people's loyalty, on their attention, and
on their solidarity. 6 If the concept of nation is too heavily imbued with the
former idea based on ethnicity, and not enough with the latter idea based
on common commitments, then it is helpful to speak not of nationalism
but of patriotism, as this latter word has already been defined. Whereas
the enemies of nationalism are cultural contamination, heterogeneity,
52. Alexander Brady, "Canada and the Model of Westminster" in William B. Hamilton, ed., The
Transferof Institutions(London: Cambridge University Press, 1964) 57; Jacques Monet, The Canadian
Crown (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1979). Indeed, one of the primary distinguishing features
of the Canadian Crown is its ongoing special relationship with the aboriginal peoples of Canada. For
further evidence of a multiform Canadian identity and symbolic life, see Jean-Benoit Nadeau & Julie
Barlow, The Story of French(Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2006) at 225 (noting that it was in fact
the Socirt6 St-Jean Baptiste that devised the anthem "0 Canada," and that the mandate of the Soci&6
to defend the rights of Francophone Canadians spawned a wide array of symbols, including the maple
leaf and the beaver!).
53. For an intriguing study of how the distinctively Canadian sense of place (or what Northrop
Frye calls "the imaginative sense of locality") intersects with the principle of federalism, see David J.
Elkins, "The Sense of Place" in David J. Elkins & Richard Simeon, eds., Small Worlds: Provinces and
Partiesin Canadian Political Life (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1980) 1 at 2, 3, 4 and 25.
54. Although a more negative view of patriotism qualifies it as the "last refuge of the scoundrel"
(the phrase is Samuel Johnson's), a more positive view suggests that it "must be founded in great
principles, and supported by great virtues." Henry James Bolingbroke, The Idea of a PatriotKing, ed.
by Sydney W. Jackman (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) at 27.
55. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "patriotism" and "patriotic", online: <http://dictionary.oed.
com>.
56. Rogers Brubaker, "In the Name of the Nation: Reflections on Nationalism and Patriotism" in
Philip Abbott, ed., The Many Faces of Patriotism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007) 38.
In the locus classicus of what constitutes a "nation," Ernest Renan had already pointed out in 1882
that the ethnodemographic basis of nationhood is a very great error. He rejected other foundations
for a nation-religious, racial, martial, linguistic, geographic and even common interests-and
instead declared that a nation is a spiritual principle, a large-scale solidarity that is the result of the
complexities of history and the sharing of a past and future. His lecture delivered at the Sorbonne on
II March 1882 is published in Henriette Psichari, ed., Oeuvres Compldtes d'Ernest Renan, t. I (Paris,
Calmann-L~vy, 1947-61) 887.
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racial impurity, and social, political, and intellectual disunion, the enemies
of patriotism are tyranny, despotism, oppression, and corruption.57 If
government no longer embodies the moral unity of a nation, perhaps the
more procedural idea of a "political" nationality founded on the federal
principle is what unites Canada. Attachment is found through a common
commitment to working out disagreements together. It might even be said
that "social, political, and intellectual disunion" is a defining aspect of
Canada. That says a lot about Canada as a nation.
3. Service to the nation
The next question that arises is what service to the nation involves. Public
sector lawyers are not just lawyers; they are also public servants. The
living legal value of service to the nation comprises, in its very fabric, a
conception of public service. That issue, in turn, requires an investigation
of the client or clients of the DoJ lawyer: a description of what service
is will be barren unless it sustains an in-built hypothesis of who and/or
what the DoJ lawyer is meant to serve. The value of service to the nation,
therefore, also carries within it the issue of who the government lawyer's
client is (hereinafter referred to as the "client identity problem"). Finally,
the question of who and/or what the DoJ lawyer serves is bound up
with another question-that of determining, in serving the DoJ lawyer's
client(s), just what the public interest is (hereinafter referred to as the
"public interest problem"). Thus, service to the nation also carries within-it
the problem of giving sufficient content to the notion of the public interest,
so that it is able to direct decisions. I begin with a general discussion of
public service, then move to the longstanding problem of the identity (or,
more properly, the lack thereof) of the government lawyer's client, and
end by suggesting a practical approach that is meant to allow DoJ lawyers
to resolve the public interest problem.
a. Public service in general
The title of this paper should not suggest that service to the nation is only,
or even primarily, a legal value. Indeed, part of what makes practice at
the DoJ unique is that it involves a special emphasis on various nonlegal values, the most important of which is public service. We should
hesitate, however, in thinking that public service values and legal values
57. Maurizio Viroli, For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995) at 1-2. It was the enemies of patriotism that led Dick the Butcher in
Shakespeare's Henry VI to declaim, "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." (Part 11,Act IV,
Scene ii, lines 83-4.) Although on its face this remark seems to suggest that all lawyers are unethical
and that therefore they should be gotten rid of, Dick was in fact urging the killing of all the lawyers as
a necessary precondition to a coup d' tat.
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are completely distinct. 8 We need a better model for the exercise of the
discretion of both the administrator (prudence) and the juridical officer
(jurisprudence) 9
Since one of the "hats" worn by DoJ lawyers is that of public servant,
how the public service literature defines service is important. I will not
attempt here to survey this vast body of research, but only to point to one
of its touchstones. Thanks in large part to the Tait Report, we have the
following definition of service:
The role of the Public Service is to assist the Government of Canada
to provide for peace, order and good government. The Constitution
of Canada and the principles of responsible government provide
the
60
foundation for Public Service roles, responsibilities and values.
The public service is meant to provide "professional, candid and frank
advice,'

6

'

and the notion of service has a number of dimensions (namely,

democratic, professional, ethical and people values). These were the "living
truths" uncovered by the Tait Report when it interviewed members of the
public service. In this very exercise of inductive discovery, as opposed to
top-down decree, public servants were affirmed as normative agents in
their own right. As outlined by the Values and Ethics Code for the Public
Service, democratic values involve helping Ministers, under law, to serve
the public interest; professional values include serving with competence,
excellence, efficiency, objectivity and impartiality; ethical values require
acting at all times in such a way as to uphold the public trust; and people
values entail demonstrating respect, fairness and courtesy in dealings with
62
both citizens and fellow public servants.
These values, the enduring beliefs described by public servants
themselves, are a central part of the DoJ lawyer's virtues. Like values,
virtues are incomplete without the capacity of judgment (practical
wisdom) that facilitates their prudent exercise in ethical life. What's more,

58. Sossin, "From Neutrality to Compassion," supra note 2; Lorne Sossin & Charles W. Smith, "Hard
Choices and Soft Law: Ethical Codes, Policy Guidelines and the Role of the Courts in Regulating
Government" (2003) 40 Alta. L. Rev. 867.
59. Douglas F. Morgan, "Administrative Phronesis: Discretion and the Problem of Administrative
Legitimacy in Our Constitutional System" in Henry D. Kass & Bayard L. Catron, eds., Images and
Identities in Public Administration (New York: Sage Publications, 1990) 67.
60. Values and Ethics Code, supra note 28 at 5-6. One can only imagine what service might mean
today had the British North America Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
App. II, No. 5 provided instead for "peake, welfare, and good government", as all the preparatory
constitutional documents had provided.
61. Values and Ethics Code, supra note 28 at 7.
62. For a more detailed description of these values, see Values and Ethics Code, supra note 28 at
7-10.
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we see in this very description of the values inherent in public service that
the problems of the identity of the DoJ lawyer's client(s) and the public
interest problem are already contained in service to the nation.
To understand the notion of public service, we must understand, in
turn, what the role of the Government of Canada is. Eugene Forsey sets
this out in striking fashion:
Governments in democracies are elected'by the passengers to steer the
ship of the nation. They are expected to hold it on course, to arrange for
a prosperous voyage, and to be prepared to be thrown overboard if they
fail in either duty.
This, in fact, reflects the original sense of the word
"government," as its
63
roots in both Greek and Latin mean "to steer.
Public servants are given a course by their Ministers, and they are meant to
work towards arriving at the final destination. Government lawyers might
then be thought of as helping to keep the government "on course." Another
way of framing service is to say that the lawyer is a keeper of her client's
conscience, 6' serving as a moral (not simply navigational) compass. This
too is a kind of service. The lawyer instills the rule of law into the workings
65
of public administration.
Precisely how DoJ lawyers do so will become clearer below in the
context of the discussion of the client identity and public interest problems,
which are themselves difficult to tease apart.
b. The client identityproblem
Government lawyers may have ethical duties to a number of different
clients. 66 In his leading text on professional responsibility, Gavin
MacKenzie has this to say about the client identity problem:
The issue of who is their client perplexes government lawyers
continually.
If we take as an example a staff lawyer employed by the Ministry of the
Attorney General of a province, the possible answers to the question,
63. Forsey, supranote I at 1.
64. Mark Orkin, cited in Stephen M. Grant, "Sex, Lies and Legal Ethics: Reflections on the Sources
of Our Virtue" in Donald E. Buckingham et al., eds., Legal Ethics in Canada: Theory and Practice
(Toronto: Harcourt Brace Canada, 1996) 146 at 149 [Legal Ethics in Canada].
65. Fritz Morstein Marx, supra note 43 at 510, 511, 512.
66. Jeffrey Rosenthal, "Who Is the Client of the Government Lawyer?" in Patricia E. Salkin,
ed., Ethical Standards in the Public Sector: A Guide for Government Lawyers, Clients and Public
Officials (Chicago: Section of State and Local Government Law, American Bar Association, 1999) 13
[Rosenthal]. Seeking insight from Rosenthal's article into the Canadian context must be approached
carefully, as the article pertains to the American context. Much of my treatment of the client identity
problem in Canada that follows flows from enlightening discussions with Matthew Sullivan.
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who is my client? include at least the lawyer's immediate superior,
the Deputy Attorney General, the Attorney General, the agencies or
other ministries on whose behalf the lawyer appears before courts and
tribunals, the government, and the public.
The question is important, and the lack of Canadian authority is
surprising.67
Here we begin to see the various possible clients of the government lawyer:
the individual fonctionnaire whom the DoJ litigator is representing; the
department in which the civil servant works; the Government of Canada
as a whole; the Canadian public; and the Crown. Which master(s) does the
DoJ lawyer serve? Perhaps all of them, and thus as a consequence, none
of them?
To begin with, it cannot seriously be suggested that the public is the
client. DoJ lawyers do not receive their instructions from the public. While
Justice lawyers are public servants with public duties, their marching orders
are not determined by plebiscite.68 And yet, despite the practical necessity
for'the DoJ civil litigator to locate authority in a concrete client or clients,
the complexity of the situation is not thereby reduced: if the identity of
the client is considered as a function of who benefits from the disposition
of the case, it becomes clear how the Canadian public as a whole can
be considered the DoJ civil litigator's client: where a successful defence
of an action against the government results in saving the expenditure of
money from out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, the DoJ lawyer saves
Canadian taxpayers money. The Canadian public also pays DoJ lawyers,
at least indirectly.
As Stager & Arthurs note, "Government lawyers generally see
themselves as responsible to the community instead of to an individual
client and as taking a wider view of circumstances in giving legal advice
to departmental colleagues ... "69 Although this point is perhaps overstated,
the general idea which it expresses is important. The traditional, binary
model of the lawyer-client relationship is muddied in the public sector
context. To begin with, the client is not .ultimately the boss, as is the case in
the private sector: section 5(d) of the Department of JusticeAct states that
the Attorney General of Canada "shall have the regulation and conduct

67. Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics: ProfessionalResponsibility and Discipline (Toronto:
Thomson Canada, 2006) at 21-1 [MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics].
68. Thanks to Matthew Sullivan for this point.
69. David A.A. Stager & Harry W. Arthurs, Lawyers in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press/Statistics Canada, 1990) at 281-82, citing G. White, "Lawyers in Government: A Preliminary
Study" in R.J. Matas & D.J. McCawley, eds., Legal Education in Canada (Montreal: Federation of
Law Societies, 1987) 747.
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of all litigation for or against the Crown or any department, in respect of
any subject within the authority or jurisdiction of Canada."70 This means,
in effect, that the DoJ can overrule the wishes of a departmental client if
push comes to shove. This is not the traditional lawyer-client relationship
that exists in the private sector, where the client is boss even if reliant on
the lawyer's advice. Interestingly, we see intimations of the client identity
problem in s. 5(d), since the section explicitly recognizes that litigation
may involve the Crown or any department. Section 23(1) of the Crown
Liability and ProceedingsAct also demonstrates the problem.7 '
Where the federal government must take a position in litigation and
the interests of government departments diverge, the Attorney General of
Canada personifies the unity of the government under s. 5(d), deciding
what is in the best interests of the Crown. In practice, conflicts between
two or more departmental clients are mediated by senior DoJ lawyers.
In especially complex files, "collective" instructions may be given by a
working group of Deputy Ministers or Assistant Deputy Ministers. The
distinctive institutional structures set up for giving legal advice in these
circumstances reflect the "wider view of circumstances" that must be
taken, particularly when dealing with the most difficult legal issues faced
by the federal government.
One possible solution to the client identity problem is simply to
decree the answer, as has been done in Alberta, where the law society has
determined that the government lawyer's client is the government as a
whole.72 In Ontario, for example, rule 2.02(1.1) of the Rules ofProfessional
Conduct, which is not limited to private sector lawyers, states that even
when a lawyer receives instructions from an authorized representative of an
institutional client, the client remains the "organization" as a whole. This
is not much help to Ontario DoJ lawyers, as "organization" is not defined
and may mean either a specific client department or the government as a
whole. More generally, the client identity problem intersects with Canadian

70. Supra note 26.
71. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50, s. 23: "Proceedings against the Crown may be taken in the name of the
Attorney General of Canada or, in the case of an agency of the Crown against which proceedings
are by an-Act of Parliament authorized to be taken in the name of the agency, in the name of that
agency."
72. See e.g. the Law Society of Alberta's Code of ProfessionalConduct, Ch. 12, Rule I <http://www.
lawsocietyalberta.com/files/Code.pdf>: "A lawyer in corporate or government service must consider
the corporation or government to be the lawyer's client." Or see Hawaii Professional Conduct Code
(1996), Comment 7 on Rule 1.13 <http://www.state.hi.us/jud/ctrules/hrpcond.htm>: "...defining
precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be
more difficult in the government context. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific
agency, it is generally the govemment as a whole."
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federalism in a way that may be problematic for a federal institution such
as the DoJ: given that each provincial law society has the constitutional
jurisdiction to regulate the federal lawyers working within the province,73
and therefore the power to define who the client is, federal DoJ lawyers
across the country may find themselves serving different masters-at least
on paper.
However, the potential for divergent definitions of who the clients of
federal lawyers are may, in the end, prove to be a non-problem. Would
defining who the client is really make a practical difference in the daily
lives of DoJ lawyers? A black-letter rule enacting that the client is the
government as a whole, for example, would not reduce the inherent
complexity in DoJ lawyers' daily professional lives. Similarly, it cannot be
that the answer to the client identity problem is as simple as determining
the proper government party that must be named in the style of cause,
which differs depending on the venue, whether an action or application is
being brought, and what the applicable federal statute says.7 4 That would
be an incongruous result.
Since ethics cannot be divorced from place, analyzing who the client
is entails different considerations in the criminal and civil context. In
the criminal context, the RCMP may be a client,75 even though federal
prosecutors are the agents of the Attorney General of Canada and Her
Majesty the Queen is the proper prosecuting party. In the civil context,
practising DoJ lawyers recognize the inherent complexity about who
the client is, but would say nonetheless that the client is the department,
since that is the entity from which they take instructions and to which
they are therefore most directly accountable. Yet, the concept of client
accountability must be understood more broadly in the public sector than
in the private sector. A "wider view of circumstances" is required once
again, since DoJ lawyers are employees, and as such they are not "retained"
by their client departments in the manner in which retainer agreements
are normally concluded in the private sector. As employees, DoJ lawyers
are accountable not only to their departmental clients, but also to their
managers within the Justice Department and to the government as a whole
through the Public Service Commission of Canada.
The nature of the accountability to departmental clients has
undergone a subtle shift in the last few decades, primarily due to financial
73. Krieger v. Law Society ofAlberta, 2002 SCC 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372.
74. See Crown Liability and ProceedingsAct, supra note 71 at s. 23; Federal Court Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. F-7, s. 48 and Schedule; Federal Court Rules, s. 303. My thanks to Dale Yurka for these
provisions.
75. R. v. Campbell, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565 at paras. 49-54.
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considerations. It used to be that the DoJ was funded like any other
government department. With the budgetary restrictions of the 1980s and
90s, however, the DoJ began "billing" its departmental clients directly.
This change in funding sources, in turn, has brought the DoJ closer to the
private sector model of practice, and it may be that departments are now
more motivated to seek greater input in the litigation process.76 From the
most practical, everyday perspective, of course, the client is the contact
person within the department who is authorized to represent and embody
the department for the purposes of conducting the litigation.
Where a Minister or other Crown servant is sued personally, that
individual will also be a client unless the potential for a conflict of
interest exists. Section 4(a) of the federal government's Policy on the
Indemnification of and Legal Assistancefor Crown Servants provides that
legal representation will be paid for out of public funds so long as the
Minister or other Crown servant "acted honestly and without malice within
their scope of duties or employment and met reasonable departmental
expectations. 7 7 Appendix B provides for the hiring of outside counsel
where "a conflict may arise between the interests of the Crown and those
of the servant, or between the interests of two or more servants who are
co-defendants."
Issues involving departments, and not only individual public servants,
can become more complex. In tort suits against the government, for
example, it may be difficult to determine who the alleged wrongdoer is. In
other cases, it may be difficult to find the client within the vast machinery
of government who has the appropriate knowledge of the matter at issue in
the litigation, or there may be multiple possible clients each one of which,
individually, is reticent to take over responsibility for the conduct of the
78
litigation.
As already stated above, indeterminacy is compatible with decisionmaking. An intuitively appealing approach to working out the client identity
problem, which may help to sharpen ethical issues, is to emphasize lines
of authority between various actors and institutions in the civil litigation
process. The client is the person or institution to whom the lawyer is most
directly accountable, who gives instructions to the lawyer, and who must
ultimately take responsibility for the lawyer's actions. Accountability in
the public sector must be understood from a wider perspective, and to

76. My thanks to Dale Yurka for this insight.
77. Online: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat <http://tbs-sct.gc.ca/chro-dprh/pol/pilacs-pifes;O Ieng.asp>.
78. 1owe my thanks to Dale Yurka for these examples.
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force a simple answer to the client identity problem in this context is to
risk sacrificing accuracy for the sake of determinacy.
c. The public interest problem
The public interest problem has a long pedigree; it presents a quandary
that, realistically speaking, is not really solvable. Miller expresses the
point well:
Despite its surface plausibility, the notion that government attorneys
represent some transcendental "public interest" is, I believe, incoherent.
It is commonplace that there are as many ideas of the "public interest" as
there are people who think about the subject.79
Miller is a professor and former DoJ advisor in the U.S., where the Federal
Bar Association has declared the government agency itself to be the
government lawyer's client. 80 This position strongly influences Miller's
treatment of the public interest problem, which focuses on agency-centric
advocacy and loyalty that defines the public interest at the interstice of
the constitutional fault lines of the various actors in government and
society. On this approach, the public interest is the product of the proper
workings of the system, which is composed of individual institutions and
persons each of whom is represented zealously by counsel. This is a view
of the public interest borne from the more Whig, classically liberal, and
egalitarian tradition in the U.S., with its focus on the separationof powers.
The approach to the public interest problem that I propose may be viewed
as a more Tory and conservative approach (in the British and European
sense), more deferential and respectful of authority, with its focus on
the concentrationof power."1 As will emerge in greater detail below, my
approach to the public interest problem is based on the democratic authority
of Parliament to legislate on behalf of the people. As mentioned previously,
the client identity and public interest problems are themselves difficult to
tease apart. Rosenthal explains why: "... there are differing interests that
can be advocated and goals achieved in fulfilling the legislative mandate,

79. Miller, supra note 44 at 1294-95. The point was made even more starkly by the Supreme Court
of Canada in R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, in which the court held that the criterion of the
"public interest" as a basis for pre-trial detention of criminal accused under the former s. 515(10)(b) of
the Criminal Code violates s.11 (e) of the Charterbecause it authorizes detention on terms which are
unconstitutionally vague and imprecise. CriminalCode, R.S.C. 1985, c. c- C-46. CanadianCharterof
Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, supra note 23.
80. American Bar Association Opinion 73-1, cited in MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics, supra note
67 at 21.2.
81. See Lipset, supra note 50 at 2.
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depending upon who is deemed to be the client."82 This foreshadows a
basic difficulty with my suggested approach, to which I return below.
In his recent article, which has "In the Public Interest" in its title,
Professor Hutchinson describes and attempts to resolve the public interest
problem. To do justice to what I take to be his basic point, I quote him at
length:
It can be insisted, therefore, without too much serious resistance, that
government lawyers are differently situated than private lawyers in that
their work takes place more directly in the immediate field of the public
interest. However, because there are so many competing notions of
what comprises the public interest and how it should apply in particular
situations, it is a notoriously difficult and contested task to designate
what ends are in the public interest and what means-which must also
be consistent with the public interest-are best pursued to realize those
ends. There is no certainty as to what those values are and even less on
what they demand in particular situations: democracy is premised on the
belief that such determinations are inherently political and are best made
by the people themselves. However, in seeking to fix and frame the ethical
obligations and professional responsibilities of government lawyers,
there is no compelling need to enter into that sprawling debate in any
definitive or exhaustive way. The more modest and pertinent question
concerns the role and responsibilities that government lawyers do and
should have in explicating or contributing to the government's duty to
act in the public interest. Fortunately, reference back to a democratic
appreciation of the public interest can point to possible answers to that
central quandary.83
By off-loading the public interest problem into the democratic arena,
this approach risks not giving sufficiently concrete ethical direction to
government lawyers in their day-to-day practices. DoJ lawyers cannot
make strategic and substantive litigation decisions through the public
opinion poll method. Not only would that be impractical-it would simply
take too long and be too costly-it would also be patently unethicalrequiring lawyers to divulge confidential information to masses of people.
Although this is absolutely not what Professor Hutchinson proposes, it is
nonetheless unclear how his approach can provide concrete direction in
the lived experience of DoJ lawyers.

82.

83.

Rosenthal, supra note 66 at 15. To the same effect, see Stager & Arthurs, supra note 69 at 283:
"In the case of professional responsibility, a government lawyer (other than a crown
attorney) may face some ambiguity about who is the client to be represented. In attempting
to represent 'the public interest' one encounters some difficulty in sorting through
conflicting and changing interests among various sectors of the general public."
Hutchinson, supra note 3 at 115-16.
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The approach I adopt contains three basic components, all of which
are premised on the value of democracy. First, the DoJ lawyer's role
begins with a commitment to service. Service, as Professor Hutchinson
demonstrates, involves explicating or contributing to the government's
duty to act in the public interest. To invoke the Forseyan analogy once
again, the DoJ lawyer helps steer the nation as part of the government.
As Professor Hutchinson notes, "government lawyers have a significant
contribution to make in debates within government about how to determine
what the public interest demands."84 Lawyers at the DoJ know that the
more important is the file on which they are the lead, the more eyes will be
required to vet the factum before it is submitted to court.
Second, the value of democracy suggests that it is helpful to draw
a distinction between the public interest simpliciter and a public interest
function. Federal Ethical Consideration 5-1 of Canon 5 of the American
Bar Association's 1973 Code of ProfessionalResponsibility states: "The
immediate professional responsibility of the federal lawyer is to the
department or agency in which he is employed, to be performed in light
of the particular public interest function of the department or agency...
Inherent in the ideal of democracy is that no single person or institution
has a monopoly on defining the public interest.86 Rather, what is in the
public interest is always a matter of debate; disagreement is a healthy
and necessary part of communal life as such. The liberalization of the
doctrine of public interest standing being signalled by the Supreme Court
of Canada 87 -even the fact of the doctrine's' existence itself-seems to
suggest that there are numerous public interest functions. The various
types of Crown lawyers, as "repositor[ies] of the public conscience, 88
just happen to exercise important ones among many.8 9 Even amongst DoJ
lawyers themselves, "[t]here is no one public interest model that applies to
all government counsel." 9°

84. Ibid. at 120-21.
85. Cited in Rosenthal, supra note 66 at 21. It is noteworthy that MacNair invokes the "public
interest role" in the work of DoJ lawyers: "In the Service of the Crown", supranote 3 at 528 [emphasis
added].
86. See RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada(Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, cited in Sterling
& Mackay, supra note 24 at para. 44.
87. Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 at paras. 186-89
(Q.L.).

88. John LI. J. Edwards uses the phrase in each of his works on Crown lawyers: The Attorney
General, Politics and the Public Interest (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984) at 139 [The Attorney
General]; The Law Officers of the Crown (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1964) at 287.
89. See Edwards, ibid., The Attorney General, c. 6 ("Leading Role but no Monopoly as Guardian of
the Public Interest"), especially at 138-39.
90. MacNair, "In the Service of the Crown," supra note 3 at 509.
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Third, and most importantly for my purposes, democracy as a value
demands respect for the legislative process, a respect which informs
what I will call a "rule of'law approach" to the public interest problem.
As advocates in civil litigation matters, government lawyers are usually
acting as the defendant's counsel.9 More often than not, a DoJ lawyer's
first instinct, when faced with litigation against the federal government, is
to go to the enabling statute and dig up the regulations.9 2 From this reflex
towards enabling statutes and regulations, an important intuition arises:
in the minds of DoJ lawyers, their public interest function is defined by
Parliament. When Parliament speaks, it expresses the democratic will of
the people in the closest possible approximation of the public interest we
have. Ritchie J. stated in Colet v. R. that in the criminal context, "[a]ll
sections of the Criminal Code are presumably enacted 'in the public
interest'..."" Going even further, I would suggest that all legislation
passed by Parliament articulates the public interest. A public official does
not serve the nation unless he acts within the confines of his statutory
94
authority.
What I have called a rule of law approach to the public interest problem
has been the subject of critique, expressed, for example, in Rosenthal's
concern that legislation is susceptible of many different interpretations
by judges and technocratic manipulations by lawyers. 95 Another way in
which Rosenthal expresses this criticism, at least indirectly, has already
been cited above, namely, that the answer to the client identity problem
will often determine the interests that are advocated for and the goals
sought to be achieved in fulfilling the legislative mandate. A combination
of Miller's agency-centric approach together with a skeptical take on the
inherent instability of the meaning of statutes seems to allow DoJ lawyers,
when representing a specific department, to co-opt the "public" interest for
other purposes entirely.
I do not offer the statute as the holy grail of the public interest, but
only as a helpful guide towards its discovery. The rules, at least, help us to
determine what we should be arguing about.96 As Maclntyre notes, rules
are an index of our conflicts 97 and therefore also tell us about ourselves.
91. Ibid. at 517.
92. The government's public interest function when acting as a plaintiff in litigation is a much more
difficult matter, requiring a separate treatment which I do not attempt to undertake here. A rule of law
approach to this issue would likely be insufficient on its own.
93. [1981] 1 S.C.R. 2 at 9.
94. Roncarelli v.Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121.
95. See e.g. Rosenthal, supra note 66 at 18-20.
96. Thanks to Professor Macdonald for this point.
97. Maclntyre, supra note II at 254.
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In this case we can say that statutory rules tell us about what we value as
a Canadian society, and about our living government as well. As MacNair
notes, "[t]he skill of the' interpretation of statutes and regulations is
important because of the organizational structure of government."98 To the
extent that statutes and regulations give contours to our public institutions,
which in turn speak to what we value as a country, they are a proxy for the
public interest.
Legislation, it is true, is susceptible of many interpretations. If statutes
were self-applying lawyers and judges would not have much to do. To
move, however, from the position that interpretation is a delicate semantic
business to the position that interpretation is a chaotic free-for-all is to forget
all of the shared understandings, practices, common-sense conventions
and pragmatism that inform lawyers' hermeneutic universe. DoJ litigators
are meant to advocate for Canada's best interests, and like all litigation
lawyers they do so in an adversarial process. The client identity and public
interest problems do not make a DoJ lawyer any less of an advocate than
any other lawyer.
The foregoing discussion has, in various ways, demonstrated the
importance ofrules in DoJ lawyers' lived experience. While rules constitute
the game and are therefore necessary for there to be a game in the first
place, they say little about how the game should be played. For that, the
right character or disposition is required, a certain kind of virtue.
III. Virtue ethics and service to the nation
To begin this section, and to tie it back into the preceding section, I return
briefly to a discussion of the Crown, this time from another perspective.
The aspect of service in service to the nation carries within it, as already
discussed, a requirement of knowing just what and/or who one is
serving (the client identity problem). The Crown is one very important
possibility. And yet, the Crown has another dimension, which was not
discussed above. The Crown and its representatives ate "living symbols
of our collective freedoms and institutions." 99 They are "living signs of
our traditions and our permanent ideals"'00 and are "an enduring part of
our living history."'' In its emphasis on living embodiments of abstract
values and the personification of the state and its institutions, the tradition
of the Crown intersects with the perspective of virtue ethics. As Queen
Elizabeth declared in Quebec City on 10 October 1964, "the role of a
98.
99.
100.
101.

MacNair, "From Polyester to Silk," supra note 3 at 145.
MacLeod, supranote 37 at 11.
Monet, supra note 52 at 82.
MacLeod, supra note 37 at 60.
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constitutional monarchy is to personify the democratic state."' °2 The
principles of constitutional-monarchical democracy are, in a very direct
way, the instantiation of a virtue ethical outlook on the world, which views
the human subject, not rules, as the focal point of ethical deliberation.
While it is more an idea than a person, the Canadian Crown manifests
itself in persons. 03 Similarly, virtue is an idea that is manifested in persons.
Governors General, for example, are moral exemplars in themselves. They
are appointed because of their excellence, because of their dedication to
public service, appreciation of many cultures, and concern for the rights of
0 4
others, all of which they "prov[e] in their very persons.'
Who some other virtuous exemplars may be, and what the practical
consequences of virtue ethics might be for practice in the DoJ, will be
discussed in the following sections. Having described in preceding
sections what the nation is, and what service to it might entail, I now wish
to propose service to the nation, more formally, as the ultimate end of
the DoJ lawyer's ethical and professional life. To do so, I will first set
the scene by giving some general background on virtue ethics and the
"teleological" approach that it entails.
Virtue theory has its roots in the writings of Aristotle in The
Nicomachean Ethics. °5 It is not my purpose to describe Aristotle's work
in detail. Only the broad outlines of his theory will be set out, and always
with the instrumental purpose of attempting to draw lessons from virtue
ethics that are helpful to the day-to-day practice of public sector lawyers.
A bird's eye view of virtue ethics looks something like this:
(1) to be a good x one must exhibit the excellence (ar~te) of x;
(2) the excellence of x lies in performing x's characteristic function
(end, purpose or telos) well-hence the "teleological" approach;
(3) performing x's characteristic function well entails developing the
virtues, traits of character and capacities associated with a wellfunctioning x;
(4) the virtues, traits of character and capacities associated with a
well-functioning x can be developed through habituation, training,
practice and modelling;

102.
103.
104.
105.

Monet, supra note 52 at 17.
Ibid. at 34.
Ibid. at 81-82.
Trans. by David Rosg (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980, reprinted in 1986).
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(5) the fundamental virtue that makes possible the possession and
exercise ofall the others is1 6practical wisdom (prudence, judgment,
deliberation orphronsis).1
For my purposes here Alasdair Maclntyre's "partial and tentative"
definition of virtue is instructive: "[a] virtue is an acquired human quality
the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those
goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively
prevents us from achieving any such goods."' 17 What, then, are "practices"
and the "goods" which are "internal" to them? For Maclntyre,
[a] practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as
well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the
authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own performance
as judged by them. It is to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences
and tastes to the standards which currently and partially define the
practice.'°s
"Goods" which are "internal" to this notion of a practice can only be
specified in terms of the practice itself, and can only be identified and
recognized by the experience of participating in the practice in question. 109
Maclntyre continues:
We are now in a position to notice an important difference between
what I have called internal and what I have called external goods. It is
characteristic of what I have called external goods that when achieved
they are always some individual's property and possession. Moreover
characteristically they are such that the more someone has of them,
the less there is for other people. This is sometimes necessarily the
case, as with power and fame, and sometimes the case by reason of
contingent circumstance as with money. External goods are therefore
characteristically objects of competition in which there must be losers as
well as winners. Internal goods are indeed the outcome of competition to
excel, but it is characteristic of them that their achievement is a good for
the whole community who participate in the practice. So when Turner
transformed the seascape in painting or W.G. Grace advanced the art of
batting in cricket in a quite new way their achievement enriched the
whole relevant community. 0

106. For greater detail than this point-form, summary outline of virtue ethics provides, see Milde's
helpful primer on Aristotle and legal ethics: supra note 12 at 55-60. For the point made in (5), see
Maclntyre, supra note 11 at 183.
107. Maclntyre, ibid. at 191 [emphasis on entire quotation omitted].
108. Ibid. at 190.
109. Ibid. at 188-89.
110. Ibid. at 190-91.
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In classical economic terms, then, a virtue is a particular species of
public good, being non-rivalrous (positive sum when consumed) and
non-excludable (impossible to exclude others from). To summarize,
a virtue is an acquired human quality that is a necessary condition for
achieving intangiblegoods that enrich, are the product of andare defined
by a community that commonly subscribes to authoritative standards
of excellence. In its pithiest formulation, a virtue is a "qualit[y] which
enable[s] an individual to do what his or her role requires."'
Having defined what a virtue is, I now move on to an explanation
of phron~sis. Simply put, a person who possesses practical wisdom is
someone who knows how to exercise judgment in particular cases, a
virtue which makes possible the exercise of all the other virtues"I2 (see (5)
in the bird's eye view of virtue ethics above). Put differently, the ability
to exercise judgment requires knowing one's place-the dynamics and
intricacies of the specific situation in which one finds oneself. Someone
may be courageous or compassionate or honest or generous, but unless
one can properly size up the situation and exercise judgment one is bound
to go wrong in exercising these other virtues. To borrow an example from
Kant, who was resoundingly not a virtue ethicist, sound judgment would
entail that the virtue of honesty be exercised in a particular way if the Grim
Reaper were to appear at your door asking for your brother.
Perhaps the most famous application ofAristotle's virtue theory to legal
ethics is Anthony T. Kronman's book, The Lost Lawyer: FailingIdeals of
the Legal Profession. "3In it he attempts to revive the "embarrassed virtue"
of the "lawyer-statesman ideal," which he argues is intimately bound up
with practical wisdom. At the heart of the lawyer-statesman ideal is the
idea that deliberation and character are fundamentally interconnected. To
be practically wise involves being a certain kind of person, with certain
intellectual and affective dispositions and traits. The lawyer-statesman is
the embodiment of a commitment to public service, combining an ability to
feel, think, and act-a capacity for deliberative imagination and the ability
to simultaneously be sympathetic and detached. The lawyer-statesman
also exhibits excellence in deliberating about human and professional
ends-which cannot be fully separated-and in how to reconcile the

111.Ibid. at 128.
112. Ibid. at 154.
113. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993) [Kronman, The Lost Lawyer].
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incommensurability of ends in daily life and legal practice.'" 4 In short,
the lawyer-statesman is a living, breathing paragon of personhood and
professionalism.
Like most important works, Kronman's book has received the
compliment of criticism from numerous directions and sources. Two
of the most prominent criticisms of Kronman's book are, first, that it
fails to tie ideals-lawyer-statesmanship and practical wisdom-to
legal practice on the ground and, second, that it conflates personal and
professional deliberation." 5 These two criticisms would seem to parallel
the two dimensions that Kronman attributes to practical wisdom-its
procedural aspect, which involves method in deliberating about how to
act in a given circumstance, and its substantive aspect, which involves
method in deliberating about one's life-choices so as to allow a person to
harmoniously integrate all that she is and does." 6 In what follows I take
up each of these criticisms of Kronman, which parallel the two aspects he
attributes to practical wisdom, and attempt to learn from and apply them in
the context of public sector lawyering. I have already taken up the former
problem in setting out the distinction between values (enduring beliefs
which influence action) and ethics (the instantiation and reconciliation of
values in concrete circumstances).
In this essay so far, I have focused for the most part on a fairly large
sub-category of lawyers, namely, government lawyers who work at the
DoJ. I have also proposed service to the nation as the characteristic
function of DoJ lawyers-that is, the end towards which DoJ lawyers must
strive (see (2) in the bird's eye view of virtue ethics above). Excellence in
DoJ lawyering resides in serving the nation (see (1) in the bird's eye view
of virtue ethics above). But this in itself, as I hope I have already made
clear, says very little. It neither prescribes nor describes adequately, in
that it fails to tie the ideal of service to the nation to the practice of actual

114. The above description has been pieced together from the following pages of Kronman's book: 3,
15, 27, 109, 161-62, 326-27, 363. For an account of the life of an economist-statesman who needed "a
cause, a vision of the good life, to which he could hitch his worldly activities", see Robert Skidelsky,
John Maynard Keynes, 1883-1946: Economist, Philosopher,Statesman (New York: Penguin Books,
2005) at 373.
115. See David B. Wilkins, "Practical Wisdom for Practicing [sic] Lawyers: Separating Ideals from
Ideology in Legal Ethics" (1995) 108 Harv. L. Rev. 458. A more recent application of virtue theory
to legal ethics, which offers justice as the ultimate end of the legal profession, seems to suffer from a
similar failure to tie values to ethics: see Justin Oakley & Dean Cocking, irtue Ethics and Professional
Roles (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 121, noting that "virtue ethics would hold that
a lawyer ought not to fulfill the requirements of their role in cases where fulfilling those requirements
would involve gross violations of justice."
116. See e.g. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, supra note 113 at 86-87.
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DoJ lawyers, proclaiming a value without adequately describing how that
value is meant to guide ethical decision-making in lived circumstances.
My argument so far has not properly accounted for the significant
heterogeneity that exists within the class of DoJ lawyers itself. My x is
not sufficiently specific to give an account of the lived experience of all
the DoJ lawyers out there. For certain other purposes, however, I believe
my approach so far has helped to justify what is perhaps the basic claim of
this paper-that the aspiration to serve the nation, as an abstract value, is
common to all DoJ lawyers. On a higher order of generality, this is what
unites DoJ lawyers, no matter what their more specific tasks, roles, titles
and functions may be. I am essentially defining a generalized "characteristic
function" for all DoJ lawyers (a centripetal force), one that is meant to
give direction for outlining further, idiosyncratic functions and ethical
dilemmas that specific types of DoJ lawyers have (a centrifugal force).
Unless one is prepared to take the extreme view that DoJ lawyers have no
shared, functional characteristics whatsoever, some common basis must
be found. That common ground, I am proposing, is service to the nation. it
is what allows for a living legal value for Justice lawyers in Canada.
Precisely because it is a living value, service to the nation will have
numerous, organic instantiations in a number of different environments.
Living legal ethics that sprout up in various locales grow from the fertility
of the living legal value of service to the nation. I therefore have to make
my x sufficiently specific in order to allow for an account of the lived
experience of at least some of the DoJ lawyers out there, and the more
refined x that I have chosen is civil litigators. At the same time, however,
given that each of the ethical sprouts emanates from the same normative
seed, some commonality will always exist. In keeping with the virtue
ethics methodology that I have adopted, the site of both divergence (based
on centrifugal forces) and commonality (based on centripetal forces) in the
normative lives of DoJ lawyers will be the virtues themselves (see (3) and
(4) in the bird's eye view of virtue ethics above). These virtues will be
further developed in Section V.
Having addressed the first criticism of Kronman's book, I now move
on to the second. To recall, the criticism is that The Lost Lawyer conflates
the personal and professional lives of lawyers. The criticism seems to
parallel the substantive aspect of practical wisdom defined by Kronman,
namely, method in deliberating about one's life-choices so as to allow a
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person to harmoniously integrate all that she is and does. 17 This aspect of
practical wisdom is, fundamentally, about striving to live a good life.
If I agree to some extent with the first criticism levelled at Kronman,
I fundamentally disagree with the second. Or, more properly, I disagree
that it is a problem at all. It is a basic premise of this paper that personal
and professional lives cannot be fully separated. The consequence is that a
"philosophy of work" requires some conception of a "philosophy of life,"
as well as the reverse. One's role is, in fact, what gives meaning to one's
life as an individual." 8 As Kronman states, "a lawyer's profession is part
of his identity and can't be put on or off like a suit of clothes."" 9 We are, to
a very great extent, what we do. Our projects make our lives meaningful;
our jobs come to define who we are. What we do, in turn, does us-it remakes and molds us. What we do "for a living" is, as the expression itself
makes clear, inseparable from our lives. Vocation and avocation are not so
distinct. The blurring between the personal and professional is particularly
acute for government lawyers who, unlike private lawyers, must think
carefully about, say, taking a leadership role in community organizing,
criticizing politicians, engaging in outside employment, publishing
articles, and accepting certain kinds of gifts.2
What makes a DoJ lawyer's personal and professional life meaningful
is the kind of person that she is challenged to become-which in practice
is intimately bound up with service to the nation-through her work in
the federal government. She submits herself to what MacIntyre calls a
practice which, as already discussed, involves a kind of surrender to the
authority of standards of excellence determined externally from her as an
agent. She must accept the attitudes, choices, and preferences that partially
define the practice. She must see herself as practising within, and being
measured by, an institution with 140 years of history serving the nation.
Service to the nation, in its various instantiations of federal lawyers'
roles, presents unique challenges and ethical dilemmas, and therefore
demands the development of particular traits and personal characteristics.
One cannot acquire the traits of character and dispositional attitudes of

117. For a deeper development by Kronman of this aspect of practical wisdom, see "Living in the
Law" (1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 835 [Kronman, "Living in the Law"].
118. Glenn, supra note 18 at 432.
119. Kronman, "Living in the Law", supra note 117 at 845.
120. 1owe this important point to Matthew Sullivan. See e.g. the brochure "Political Activities and
You," online: Public Service Commission of Canada <http://www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/plac-acpl/brochuredepliant/brochure-eng.pdf>. DoJ employees engaging in political activities are governed by Part 7
of the Public Service Employment Act, supra note 21, the purpose of which is to reconcile political
activities with the principle of political impartiality in the public service (s. 112).
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a lawyer without also experiencing a change of identity.' 2' Virtue theory
mandates that becoming an ethical DoJ lawyer means finding the right
role models, and looking to them for guidance. Who we choose as our role
models-our biographical guidance-is an important ethical decision in
itself, but it is not only our decision. Put differently, we have some latitude
in what we choose to do, but what we choose to do in turn points us toward
certain role models who influence us and thereby change who we are. We
are free to choose our practice (in MacIntyre's sense) but, having done so,
the practice to a very great extent chooses us, in the sense that it chooses
our role models for us and those role models in turn affect our character
and identity.
IV. A complementary approach to virtues and rules
In this section I begin by drawing on important empirical work carried out
in Ontario by.Wilkinson and colleagues, which has resulted in data giving
rise to numerous articles." 2 The authors found that the majority of lawyers
practising in Ontario did not find the Professional Conduct Handbook'23
a useful tool. 2 4 The real question, of course, is why these lawyers found
this to be the case. Why was the code of conduct in question not felt to
be useful? The possible responses to this question suggest that Canadian
legal ethics scholarship is in need of a more nuanced understanding of the
complementarity in daily law practice of the virtues of people and the rules
in codes.
One response is simply that we need better codes of conduct. Professor
Wilkins argues, for example, that legal ethics must develop "middle-level"
principles specific to different social and institutional contexts of lawyerly
practice (that is, different places).2 5 Another possible response is that
virtue theory is of practical importance in the daily lives of lawyers. That
lawyers talk first to their role models when they have ethical dilemmas

121. Kronman, "Living in the Law", supra note 117 at 841.
122. Peter Mercer, Maragaret Ann Wilkinson & Terra Strong, "The Practice of Ethical Precepts:
Dissecting Decision-Making by Lawyers" (1996) 9 Can. J.L. & Jur. 141 (setting out the research
methodology and background); Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Christa Walker & Peter Mercer, "Testing
Theory and Debunking Stereotypes: Lawyer's Views on the Practice of Law" (2005) 18 Can. J.L.
& Jur. 165; Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Christa Walker & Peter Mercer, "Do Codes of Ethics Actually
.Shape Legal Practice?" (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 645 [Wilkinson, Walker & Mercer, "Codes"].
123. Law Society of Upper Canada, ProfessionalConduct Handbook, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Law Society
of Upper Canada, 1998) (containing the Rules of ProfessionalConduct).
124. See especially Wilkinson, Walker & Mercer, "Codes", supra note 122.
125. David B. Wilkins, "Legal Realism for Lawyers" (1990-1991) 104 Harv. L. Rev. 469. This is
also the approach favoured by Professor Hutchinson, who bemoans the failure of professional codes
of conduct to differentiate between government lawyers and private sector lawyers. See Hutchinson,
supranote 3.
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seems to hold empirically, and notjust as a matter of virtue ethics theory.'26
The practice of looking to other people for guidance, as opposed to simply
written rules, may suggest that codes of conduct are not only inadequate,
but that they have inherent limitations as guides to ethical behaviour.
Living, breathing role models are needed in addition to rules for the
simple reason that no code of conduct could ever be exhaustive. Virtue
ethics is premised on the uncodifiability of ethical judgment,'2 7 and virtue
ethicists attribute this uncodifiability to the tyranny of circumstance. 128 The
complex problems that arise in the minutiae of human affairs cannot be
regulated away. Good judgment cannot be codified. More controversially,
it might even be said that one does not really have an ethical dilemma if
the situation in which one finds oneself falls squarely and neatly within
the letter of a code of conduct manual. When written rules do not provide
adequate guidance, however, one must look to biographical guidance: it
is people with experience and judgment who can best help others resolve
ethical dilemmas. And yet, codes of conduct will nevertheless be helpful
in resolving such problems. A more nuanced understanding is needed of
129
the interaction between rules and roles, between law and ethics.
Wilkinson and colleagues interviewed 180 lawyers from firms of
various sizes across Ontario. One lawyer said that he consulted senior
lawyers in his firm because it was "valuable to obtain the views of more
senior people" before making ethical decisions. 30 Another lawyer said that
when faced with an ethical problem, he decided first about his beliefs about
right and wrong, and then "you talk to anybody whose judgment you trust
to tell you whether or not they think your internal compass is on point."''
An immigration lawyer in a small town said, "[glenerally with refugee
problems, if I have an ethical dilemma I talk to somebody inside and I
generally talk to one of the two or three sort of 'Deans of the profession' in
the town."'' 12 Invoking an age-old Aristotelian idea, one lawyer remarked,
"The Code of ProfessionalConduct, in some cases I think, is inadequate

126. Margaret Ann Wilkinson, "Information Sources Used by Lawyers in Problem-Solving: An
Empirical Exploration" (2001) 23 Library & Information Science Research 257 [Wilkinson].
127. Heidi Li Feldman, "Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?"
(1995-1996) 69 S.Cal. L. Rev. 885 at 943.
128. Ibid. at 909.
129. In this regard I have been inspired by the following articles: David Braybrooke, "No Rules
without Virtues: No Virtues without Rules" (1991) 17 Social Theory and Practice 139; and Feldman,
ibid. The latter author defines the characteristic function of lawyers, at 927, as follows: "While acting
in a representative capacity, a lawyer enables cooperation and manages competition, specifically in
situations involving diverse, not necessarily congruent interests."
130. Wilkinson, Walker & Mercer, "Codes", supra note 122 at 657.
13 1. Ibid at 669.
132. Ibid at 670.
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but that is the function of not being able to provide in any code for all
situations which can arise in the course of human conduct.... And in fact
I think the Law Society itself has in a way. inferred and agreed with the
inadequacy of the Code by having a Practice Advisory Committee and
you can call up a practitioner and ask for advice or guidance in ethical
dilemmas."' 33 A partner in a firm resolved a conflict of interest problem
by talking it over with other partners in the firm. 3 4 When faced with a
strategic issue concerning whether to convert a motion into a summary
judgment motion, one lawyer discussed the issue with some colleagues
even before beginning any research.'35 Finally, in a separate study based
on the same data, Margaret Ann Wilkinson's results suggest that lawyers'
information-seeking practices strongly favour informal sources such as
colleagues and role models over formal sources such as rule- and code36
based research. 1
That the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service provides for
ethical mentorship, therefore, is both a positive thing and potentially
unnecessary: "When faced with an ethical dilemma, public servants are
encouraged to use the opportunities and mechanisms established by their
Deputy Head to raise, discuss and resolve issues of concern related to this
Code."' 37 Deputy Heads have, under the Code, the obligation to designate
a senior official who can assist public servants to resolve issues pertaining
to the Code.'38 These provisions in the Code are positive to the extent
that they facilitate the human inclination to seek out informal, personto-person ethical guidance. These types of human interactions should be
facilitated by the DoJ-even assuming they would happen informally in
any event-with measures as simple as a formal mentorship programme
for new recruits.
As of June 2009,554 employees at the DoJ were registered in the
National Mentoring Program, launched in September 2008, which pairs
associates with mentors across the DoJ so they can share knowledge and
experience and learn from one another. 3 9 It is worth noting, in addition, that
various law societies and other professional organizations across Canada

133. Ibid. at 673-74.
134. Ibid. at 676.
135. Ibid. at 677.
136. See Wilkinson, supra note 126.
137. Vatues and Ethics Code, supra note 28 at 14.
138. Ibid. at 15, sub-section (c).
139. Sylvie Coutu-Bell, "A Mentoring Relationship - Spotlight on the National Mentoring Program"
(2009) 11 Justinfo 1.
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have, or are planning, mentorship programs. 4 ° How these programs
operate in practice, who uses them, and how and why they are used present
interesting questions for future empirical research. The efficacy and value
of mentorship in helping to inform and develop ethical judgment stems,
in part, from the nature of mentorship itself, which is a relationship that
transcends the distinction between the personal and the professional and
thereby recognizes the lived reality that personal and professional lives
cannot be fully separated.
Collectively, the empirical work of Wilkinson and colleagues
surveyed above demonstrates that in the day-to-day practice of lawyers
rules of conduct are less important than roles of conduct in working
out ethical problems. This is not to say, however, that codes of conduct
should be abandoned. In many ways, such codes are extremely valuable
tools for practising lawyers. They are symbols of what it means to be a
professional, and also an important public statement of right and wrong.
In what follows I turn to a more formal discussion of lawyers' codes of
conduct, and then attempt to better understand how rules and roles can
complement one another-in a way that goes beyond merely valuing
experience in interpreting and following rules.
Law societies' rules fall within the meaning of "law" for the purposes
of s. 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.4 ' While codes set out
minimum, formal, proscriptive rules (prohibitive "don'ts"), I begin from
the premise that ethical conduct is better facilitated through role-driven,
informal, aspirational ideals (prescriptive "do's").'42 As the empirical
work on codes of professional conduct already discussed demonstrates,
"[c]odes of ethics can be expected to play only a limited role in influencing

140. See online: Law Society of Alberta <http://www.lawsocietyalberta.com/lawyerservices/
mentorprogram av9whE.cfm>; Law Society of British Columbia <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/
licensing membership/profdev/report-mentoring.pdf>; Law Society of Manitoba <http://www.
lawsociety.mb.ca/communique/communiquenov01.htm#Mentor>; Law Society of Newfoundland
and Labrador <http://www.lawsociety.nf.ca/otherservices.asp>; Law Society of Nova Scotia <http://
www.nsbs.org/documents/equity/EQ120407_MentoringEnrollment Form.pdf>; Law Society of
Ontario <http://rc.lsuc.on.ca/pdf/mentorship/mentor registration- form.pdf>; Young Bar Association
of Montreal <http://www:barreaudemontreal.qc.ca/loads/ Guide%20du%20mentor/ 20ENG.pdf>;
Law Society of Saskatchewan <http://www.lawsociety. sk.ca/NewLook/Programs/mentor.htm>.
141. Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students - British
Columbia Component, 2009 SCC 31 at para. 58.
142. Interestingly, the American Bar Association's 1969 Model Code, which adopts a hybrid approach
that integrates mandatory minimum standards with hortatory, supererogatory prescriptions, was partly
inspired by a famous distinction drawn by the co-chair of the committee who helped draft it: Lon
Fuller put the difference between the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration into action. See
David Luban, "Rediscovering Fuller's Legal Ethics" in Willem J. Witteveen & Wibren van der Burg,
eds., Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and InstitutionalDesign (Amsterdam: Amsterdam
University Press, 1999) 193 at 199.
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lawyers' attitudes and behaviour ..."14 The more critical positions on such
codes range from the view that they are as worthless as a valentine's card
to a surgeon in an operating room,'" to as counter-productive to ethics
as saltwater is to thirst. 45 For the purposes of analyzing ethical decisionmaking in the actual practice of law, codes of conduct are viewed by
some commentators as a distraction from the real issue, namely, the types
of clients for whom lawyers act and the related incentives for ethical
46
conduct. 1
And yet, nowhere is the reflex to regulate through chirographic,
propositional rules stronger than in the legal domain. Lawyers trade in
rules, and as such lawyers' solutions to problems are more often than
not legislative in nature. The predictable impulse to propositionalize and
decree is no different in the domain of legal ethics. On this view, legal
ethics is about promulgating "lawyers' rules," an ongoing project which
the Canadian Bar Association began in 1920.14 Canada's legal professions
promulgate codes of ethics, of course, the better to be ethical! 48 It may
also be that the promulgation of codes of ethics-and of rules generallyis premised upon a healthy distrust of discretion and uncertainty, as well
as the institutional necessity for licensing bodies to have sanction and
enforcement mechanisms at their disposal.
An overly heavy emphasis on codes, however, risks turning ethical
decision-making into a rote search for rules-into a matter of technique,
143. Gavin MacKenzie, "Codes of Ethics" in Legal Ethics in Canada,supra note 64 at 39.
144. Gavin MacKenzie, "The Valentine's Card in the Operating Room: Codes of Ethics and the
Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession" (1994-1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 859.
145. Loder, supra note 48.
146. Mark H. Aultman, "Cracking Codes" (1993-1994) 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 735. How the client
identity problem bears on the lived experience of DoJ lawyers has already been discussed.
147. Canadian Bar Association, Code of ProfessionalConduct, adopted by Council in August 2004
and February 2006 (when latest amendments occurred); Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of
ProfessionalConduct, adopted by Convocation on 22 June 2000, last amended 26 June 2008; Quebec
Code of Ethics ofAdvocates, R.Q. c. B- 1, r. 1, enacted pursuant to An Act respecting the Barreau du
Quebec, R.S.Q., c. B-I, s. 15 and the ProfessionalCode, R.S.Q., c. C-26; Law Society of Alberta,
Code of ProfessionalConduct, adopted 1 February 2007 (when latest amendment occurred); Law
Society of Saskatchewan, Code of Professional Conduct, adopted by Convocation on 26 September
1991, latest amendment occurred 2 March 2007; Law Society of British Columbia, Professional
Conduct Handbook, adopted I May 1993, last amendment 2 October 2008; Law Society of Manitoba,
Code of ProfessionalConduct, latest revision 17 May 2007; Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, Legal
Ethics Handbook, adopted February 1990, latest amendment October 2008; New Brunswick Law
Society, Code of Professional Conduct, approved by Council 18 August 2003, latest amendment
March 2006; Newfoundland and Labrador Law Society, Rules and Code of Professional Conduct,
adopted 7 December 1998; Law Society of Prince Edward Island, Code of Professional Conduct,
adopted by Council in 1987; Yukon Law Society, Code of Professional Conduct.
148. W. Wesley Pue, "Becoming 'Ethical': Lawyers' Professional Ethics in Early Twentieth Century
Canada" (1991) 20 Man. L.J. 227 (describing the history of the codification of the CBA's Code of
ProfessionalConduct).
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as opposed to deliberation. If there is no rule against something, the
inclination might be, then the action can be taken. The problem this creates
is that it off-loads ethical agency on to a professional conduct manual: we
don't decide; the rules do. That position does not properly describe ethical
life as such. At all times, it is people who make decisions: it is the living
agency of humans more so than rules that is the locus of ethical lived
experience. According to the Tait Report, people do not make values the
true well-spring of conduct by looking to the rules; they do so by looking
first to people:
Whether as children or as adult professionals we do not absorb or learn
to have values primarily through rules: we do so through people, through
rewards for obedience and discipline for disobedience, and through
example. The rules come afterward. They codify and summarize what
we already know or believe. They serve as a handy checklist. But they
do not motivate in and of themselves, or they do so only at second hand,
because we are already internally disposed to respect them.
We learn to hold and to live values because we see others do so:
either exemplary role models such as parents, teachers, or outstanding
colleagues; or simply the routine goodness exemplified by many people in
our various communities. We learn about the good not from abstractions
but from encountering it in real life, embodied in real persons.'4 9
With its intense focus on rules, Canadian legal ethics scholarship has
lamentably overlooked the importance of character. Rules can usefully
channel how law is practised, but not as significantly as is often presumed.
Amidst this deontological fervour, not enough attention has been paid to the
plain fact that law is practised by people. Perhaps this has gone unnoticed
simply because it is so maddeningly obvious, but one of its fundamental
consequences is less obvious: law and ethics cannot be completely separate
and distinct from one another, 50 since lawyers personify their intersection.
Daily life blurs the conceptual lines between different normative regimes.
For precisely the same reason, written rules and living paragons of virtue
intersect, interact and inform one another.
Professor Glenn offers another way of reflecting upon the
complementary nature of rules and roles:
149. Tait Report, supra note 4 at 51.
150. For a contrary view, see e.g. John Ladd, "The Quest for a Code of Professional Ethics: An
Intellectual and Moral Confusion" in Rosemary Chalk, Mark S. Frankel & Sallie B. Chafer, eds.,
Professional Ethics Activities in the Scientific and Engineering Societies (Washington: American
Association for the Advancement of Science Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility,
1980) 154, online: Education Resources Information Centre <http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/
ericdocs2sql/content storage_01/000001 9b/80/37/b 1/73.pdf>.
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Standards address the question of how one acts and assume the existence
of an articulated role the standard is meant to implement. In contrast,
rules tell one what to do, in a particular case, and their implementation
appears to require no concept of a professional role or professional
standards. To the extent that a profession seeks rules in order to know
what to do, it is clear
that it lacks a clear sense of role informing it as to
5
how it should act.' 1
To put this fascinating insight differently, it might be said that rules tell
us what to do, while roles show us how to be. The rules of tennis, for
example, cannot tell Roger Federer how to react when Andy Roddick
hits him a particularly challenging serve.' 52 No rule-book can impart the
kind of knowledge gained by experience: that kind of knowledge is not
knowledge of or knowledge that; it is know-how. One develops that kind
of skill only through learning by doing. Becoming a lawyer, then, is not
simply a matter of being subject to a special regulatory regime, nor will
more rules help in this process unless the rules are somehow tied to living
exemplars of what it is to be a lawyer.
Of course, a lawyers' code of conduct is itself an important symbol
of what it means to be a lawyer. Codes are an important public, formal
statement of obligation, and for the busy practitioner they are a ready and
useful reference point.'53 A code, just like a role model, is most beneficial
when it raises ethical issues without definitively answering them. 5 4 This
approach only minimally reduces certainty and predictability-since much
of what can be found in codes is often fairly intuitive-and should also
help to stimulate ethical deliberation. To use Professor Glenn's technical
term, a code of conduct should not set out rules, but standards. A code
must point towards the exercise of discretion and deliberation, rather than
away from it. Such a document would be less like a code and more like
a constitution.'5 5 As in the case of a role model, it is a constitution which
guides us: we find guidance in character, in people.
If it is primarily people who can help us deliberate over ethical
questions, there will inevitably be different kinds of people in different
places. It is to one such place, the civil litigation environment, which I
now turn.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Glenn, supra note 18 at 434 [reference omitted].
Thanks to Daniel Wilner for this helpful example.
Loder, supra note 48 at 329.
Ibid. at 330.
Ibid. at 134.
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V. Civil litigationat the DoJ.: towards an ethics ofplace
Two dimensions of knowing one 's place that are mentioned in
the Introduction remain to be discussed: the individual's personal
characteristics and temperament (see point (3) in the bird's eye view of
virtue ethics above), and the specific government agency, department or
office in which a lawyer works. I will discuss these issues side by side in
this section.
As advocates, DoJ civil litigators may, for example, oppose motions
for strategic reasons, seek to strike out pleadings, argue over proper venue,
or seek summary judgments. As public servants, by contrast, one of their
chief goals is to promote access to justice by simplifying the procedural
path of each litigant, especially for self-represented litigants or other
parties at a disadvantage. Practical wisdom is required to remain faithful
to the greater public service values at stake in the litigation process, even
while employing every procedural tool at the Crown's disposal in order
to ensure that clients' legal interests are vigorously defended. 5 6 Precisely
what this role requires, in moving from values to ethics and navigating the
often conflicting demands of advocacy and public service, is not always
that clear.
The litigation environment in the federal government is a distinctive
place. Although we can speak generally of a "DoJ" culture, it must be
recognized that the DoJ subsumes multiple cultures, many places, and
myriad ways of serving the nation. Formy purposes here, I adopt Kronman's
definition of culture, namely, "the attitudes and interests that the members
of a group share and that define, for them, the point or purpose of their
participation in it."' 57 The measure of ethical conduct is not determined by
any type of formal regulation, but instead by the personal characteristics
of individual lawyers, the professional circumstances of their practice
("culture"), and the social, political, economic and cultural forces inside
and outside the profession which mark off what is ethically deviant and
therefore what should be sanctioned.'58 Consequently, the sub-culture of
DoJ civil litigation will to a large extent determine for itself what the
principle of service to the nation means in practice. The sub-culture, in,
turn, is formed by relations within a community composed of people.
Culture is an artifact: it is a product of people and their interactions. The
156. Thanks to Matthew Sullivan for bringing this tension into full relief for me.
157. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, supra note 113 at 291. The burden of this paper has been to show
that service to the nation is an attitude and interest that all DoJ lawyers share and that defines, for them,
the point or purpose of their lives in the DoJ.
158. H.W. Arthurs, "The Dead Parrot: Does Professional Self-Regulation Exhibit Vital Signs?" (19941995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 800.
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(sub-)culture of the DoJ (civil litigators), therefore, is constructed from its
people and their interactions, and therefore who the people are is crucial.
That is the first reason why personal characteristics and office environment
should be discussed side by side.
But the reverse also holds. The discussion of virtue ethics above has
demonstrated, I hope, that DoJ culture writ large and the civil litigation subculture within it are formative of the personal character of its lawyers. That
is the second reason why personal characteristics and office environment
should be discussed side by side. To choose to be a DoJ civil litigator is
to submit oneself to the standards of a particular discipline in a particular
place, and to recognize that one must look for guidance to the authoritative
models of excellence that that particular place proclaims as its exemplars
of role, of professionals, of virtuous servants of the nation.
Recall that I have already attempted to develop some virtues that
are generally applicable to the class of DoJ lawyers as a whole-which
are centripetal forces in the lived experiences of DoJ lawyers-namely,
a philosophical bent that helps- in thinking through the indeterminacies
inherent in public practice; the ability and judgment to cut through
philosophical problems and take reasoned, phronetic decisions that fit the
context, even in the face of uncertainties; a qualified notion of Canadian
patriotism; the belief in the spirit of service to the nation, and the aspiration
to put it into practice in day-to-day professional life. The model DoJ
lawyer, I conclude, should embody the contemplative character of a "clearheaded philosopher of democratic governance" ' 51 9 and the decisiveness,
pragmatism, practicality and perceptiveness of an action-taker-not only
a democratic "lover of wisdom" (philo-sophia), but also a real-world
doer. These excellences of character are applicable to all DoJ lawyers,
whether they are Crown prosecutors, legislative drafters, legal advisors,
policy lawyers, or civil litigators. In F.R. Scott was "exemplified that best
product of the professional, the scholarly humanist who is also a man of
action."' 16 As an academic and advocate, a law professor and lawyer, "[h]e
was not interested in abstractions for their own sake but in principles, their
operations and effects in specific law cases.' 16' In this combination of the
contemplative and the practical, Scott embodies the ideal of deliberative
judgment that Aristotle called phronesis.

159. Fritz Morstein Marx, supra note 43 at 513.
160. The McGill Daily, 28 January 1959, cited in Djwa, supra note 6 at 315.
161. Ibid at 235, citing Gerald Le Dain, "FR. Scott and Legal Education" in Sandra Djwa & R.
St. J. Macdonald, eds., On FR. Scott: Essays on His Contributionsto Law, Literature, and Politics
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's Uniyersity Press, 1983) 103 at 104.
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Civil litigators are one constellation among many within the universe
of DoJ lawyering. I turn now to a first try at fleshing out a virtue peculiar
to DoJ civil litigation lawyers.162 It is perhaps, more properly, a general
theme that arises in the DoJ litigation context. Litigation is where the
public policy rubber hits the road. It is a process in which two ethical
"frames" collide with one another: the bureaucratic rationality of state
programs serves as the toile de fond to an alleged injustice done to a
particular, identifiable individual. In civil litigation, macro values run
up against micro values. Of necessity, the DoJ civil litigator must be
concerned with, and must advocate for, the macro frame over the micro.
As Professor Roach reminds us,
The Attorney General [of Canada] is the quintessential repeat player
in litigation, and will be concerned about the systemic implications of
particular claims of Charter or aboriginal rights. Even though it may
not be a disaster to lose a particular case, the government may find that
an adverse Charter ruling significantly limits its policy options in the
future. The Attorney General has to worry not only about the particular
case, but about its effects on many cases down the line.' 63
The lived experience of DoJ civil litigators is fraught with two distinct
concerns about distributive justice-one about the ability of the state to
implement its programs and policies, and the other about the precedential
effects of judicial pronouncements. Both concerns, however, demand
that the DoJ civil litigator exhibit and embody a particular excellence of
character: it is the ability to advocate for the "realization of collective
goals of fundamental importance"' 6 4 and to have the wisdom to know how
best to reconcile the broader collective interests of the state with those of
its individual citizens.
This is invariably a difficult task, both professionally and personally. It
strains the role morality of those who aspire to it. To argue for the integrity
of the system, in the abstract, in the face of a concrete, identifiable victim
of the system, who may even be sitting in the courtroom, is a difficult
persuasive and emotional burden. John Rawls famously argued inA Theory
ofJustice 65 that the classical theory of utilitarianism violates commonsense
notions of fairness, since on the margin it requires individuals to suffer for
the benefit of the greater good. Those individuals will invariably want
to know, of course, "Why us and not others?" There are different kinds

162. Some more obvious, generally applicable, civil litigation virtues such as the ability to undertake
cost-benefit analysis, strategy, and sang-froidwill not be canvassed.
163. Roach, supra note 24 at para. 29.
164. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 136.
165. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971).

Service to the Nation: A Living Legal Value
for Justice Lawyers in Canada

217

of justice, macro and micro, and in the adversarial process the DoJ civil
litigator will be required, in most circumstances, to advocate for the large66
scale dimension of justice.
The virtue that I propose, then, which is peculiar to the DoJ civil
litigator, is the persuasive ability of an advocate to maximize the force of
larger, communal or institutional arguments. It must be asked, however,
whether this proposed virtue represents the triumph of detachment over
sympathy. What of the central place of feeling in the process of ethical
deliberation? For the DoJ civil litigator, having sympathy for the little guy
may be a strategic advocacy advantage, since it will help her to frame the
most persuasive arguments in favour of broader communal concerns even
while minimizing any David versus Goliath effect which may exist. For
reasons equally instrumental but more positive, the virtuous character of
DoJ civil litigators will be exemplified in how they make hard decisions:
exercising a public trust means that the greater the consequences of the
decision, the greater must be the engagement with the concerns of the
.other side. 167
VI. Choosingrole models
The Aristotelian wisdom still holds true today: we should take those who
deliberate best as our role models. All law societies have a "good character"
requirement. 6 ' The Law Society of Upper Canada, however, appears to
have a particularly minimalist conception of just what constitutes "good

166. Of course, the plaintiff suing the government will not always make micro-type arguments. In
class actions, for example, which are a growing source of litigation against the federal government,
the plaintiff(s) will invariably make macro-type arguments. The number of class action proceedings
against the Crown increased from thirty-five in 2000 to 171 in 2008. (See Letter from the Honourable
Rob Nicholson to the Honourable Shawn Murphy, online: Government Response to the fourth report
of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 40th ParI., 2nd Sess. <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/
HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=I&Parl=40&Ses=2&Docld=4012061 &Fi
le=0> at Recommendation 3.
167. My thanks to the anonymous reviewer for this point.
168. See e.g. s. 27(2) of Ontario's Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. L.8: "It is a requirement for the
issuance of every licence under this Act that the applicant be of good character." For an important panCanadian analysis and critique of this requirement, rooted in virtue ethics, which stresses being virtuous
(character), and also rooted in social psychology, which stresses the ethics of places (circumstances),
see Woolley, supra note 12.
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character."' 6 9 So far, the point that our choice of practice (in Maclntyre's
sense) chooses our role models for us may have been over-emphasized.
Choosing our role models is itself an important ethical decision, and role
models need not necessarily derive from any particular field of activity.
We may learn as much in choosing our role models as we do when we
seek their counsel. (They need not be lawyer-statesmen.) We have many
role models for many purposes and dimensions of human activity. Not
only must we deliberate about our ends; we must also deliberate about our
aspirations in the flesh.
A lawyer may have other lawyers as role models. The former
Attorney General of Israel, for example, Elyakim Rubinstein, advocated
for Aristotle's golden mean rule, which says that virtue and judgment
are a matter of balancing extremes.' But a lawyer's role model need
not be a real person. There is much to be learned from the fictional life,
for example, of Atticus Finch.' 7 ' To take another example, teachers
are the very definition of role models, for they are "a medium for the
transmission of values"' 72 and it is their job to facilitate the fullest possible
development of the human person. Teachers prove certain excellences in
their very persons, and through the "out-pulling of knowledge" that is the
proper function of a teacher (at least according to some),'73 they inspire

169. According to Question 1 of the licensing process application for articling students, the applicant
is of "good character" unless:
(a) under the Young Offenders Act or Youth CriminalJustice Act, you were found guilty of
an offence and the disposition was an absolute discharge and it has been one year since
you were found guilty;
(b) under the Young Offenders Act or Youth CriminalJusticeAct, you were found guilty of
an offence and the disposition was a conditional discharge and it has been three years
since you were found guilty;
(c) under the Young Offenders Act or Youth CriminalJustice Act, you were found guilty of a
summary conviction offence and it has been three years since all dispositions in respect
of the offence were made or completed, whichever is applicable; or
(d) under the Young Offenders Act or Youth CriminalJustice Act, you were found guilty
of an indictable conviction offence and it has been five years since all dispositions in
respect of the offence were made or completed, whichever is applicable. Online: Law
Society of Upper Canada <http://rc.lsuc.on.ca/pdf/licensingprocesslawyer/general
lp2 I memOnllineAppProcess.pdf>.
170. Elyakim Rubinstein, "The Attorney General in Israel: A Delicate Balance of Powers and
Responsibilities in a Jewish State" in Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ed., Israeli Institutions at the
Crossroads(New York: Routledge, 2005) 143.
171. See e.g. Cynthia L. Fountaine, "In the Shadow of Atticus Finch: Constructing a Heroic Lawyer"
(2004) 13 Widener L.J. 123; Teresa Godwin Phelps, "Atticus, Thomas, and the Meaning of Justice"
(2002) 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 925; Robert Batey, "Race and the Limits of Narrative: Atticus Finch,
Boris A. Max, and the Lawyer's Dilemma" (2006) 12 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 389.
172. Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1
S.C.R. 772 at para. 1.3,citing Ross v. New Brunswick School DistrictNo. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825.
173. Djwa, supra note 6 at 230.
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their pupils to be better persons themselves. 7 4 In the most general terms,
lawyers should seek out role models who have a keen moral-perceptual
sense-those who perceive when they are facing an ethical dilemma-and
who have the judgment to react accordingly. Put differently, much of lived

ethics involves a "smell test," a certain kind of attunement to the situation,
which is a precondition for acting morally in the first place.
Role models are the solution to the uninspired reception by some
commentators of Lon Fuller's "morality of aspiration." That the morality
of aspiration may sometimes fly too high, or seem too distant from human
conductparterre,and thereby fail to influence human agency, may explain
the sometimes critical view of aspiration as reducing ethics to inspiration.'75
The downfall of aspiration occurs when what we aspire to is so far away
that we cannot even aim at it. The phrase "aspiration in the flesh," which I
have used to indicate role models, points to the solution to the problem of
the lack of "aspirational pull ' 17 6 in what we strive for. An aspiration is only
too far away when it is not lived. People are not infallible; they are after all
human. Sandra Djwa's biography of F.R. Scott is a charitable portrayal that
opts, at times, for tip-toeing over telling all. When we see our aspirations
embodied in real people-who prove the values at which we aim "in their
very persons"-we are provided with concrete ethical guidance. We see
that real life necessarily involves imperfection, idiosyncrasy, chance and
subtlety. We learn the most when see in our very aspirations the minutiae
174. Although it is a fascinating avenue for research, the question of legal ethics education is beyond
the scope of this paper. See e.g. Peter H. Schuck, "Lawyers and Policymakers in Government" (1998)
61:1-2 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7; Walter Gellhom, "The Law Schools' Responsibility for Training
Public Servants" (1941-1942) 9 U. Chicago L. Rev. 469; Thomas B. Metzloff, "Seeing the Trees within
the Forest: Contextualized Ethics Courses as a Strategy for Teaching Legal Ethics" (1995) 58:3-4 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 227; Richard Devlin, Jocelyn Downie & Stephanie Lane, "Taking Responsibility:
Mandatory Legal Ethics in Law Schools" (2007) 65 The Advocate 761; Lisa G. Lerman, "Teaching
Moral Perception and Moral Judgment in Legal Ethics Courses: A Dialogue About Goals" (1998)
39 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 457; Jocelyn Downie, "A Case for Compulsory Legal Ethics Education in
Canadian Law Schools" (1997) 20 Dalhousie L.J. 224; Donald E. Buckingham, "Rules and Roles:
Casting Off Legal Education's Moral Blinders for an Approach that Encourages Moral Development"
(1996) 9 Can. J.L. & Juris. 111; Harry Arthurs, "Why Canadian Law Schools Do Not Teach Legal
Ethics" in Kim Economides, ed., Ethical Challenges to Legal Education and Conduct (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 1998) 105; Alice Woolley & Sara. L. Bagg, "Ethics Teaching in Law School" [20071 Can.
Legal Educ. Ann. Rev. 85; Amy Gutman, "Can Virtue Be Taught to Lawyers?" (1992-1993) 45 Stan.
L. Rev. 1759. For an argument that relegating ethics to a specific course denudes it of all importance,
see psychologist Barry Schwartz's talk online: Ted-ideas Worth Spreading <http://www.ted.com/
talks/barryschwartz on our loss of wisdom.html>.
175. See e.g. F.C. DeCoste, "Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Professional Responsibility"
(2001) 50 U.N.B.L.J. 109, especially at 113, n. 13 (decrying, amongst others, the Canadian Judicial
Council's Ethical Principlesfor Judges (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1998), a document cast
almost entirely in the morality of aspiration). Ironically, the author presents, at 119-120, a discussion
of "character" that is strongly albeit implicitly rooted in virtue ethics.
176. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, supra note 113 at 5.
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of life. It is perhaps the central insight of virtue ethics that the biographical
and the ethical live together.
Conclusion
As a public service value, service to the nation both unites and differentiates
lawyers working at the DoJ. Serving the nation is, or at the very least
should be, a common, enduring belief amongst all DoJ lawyers. That is
what unites them. And yet, serving the nation means different things to,
and entails different ethical issues for, the various types of DoJ lawyers.
That is what differentiates them.
Because it is really only the sum of ourselves, government grows and
changes as we do.' 77 Put differently, the ethics of people and the ethics
of places are intertwined. Another way of re-framing the interaction
between people, places and ethics--or perhaps a different dimension of
their encounter-is to view people as internal to the process of judgment,
' Legal ethics needs to focus more energy on the
instead of external to it. 78
daily lives of practising lawyers, their choices, and the institutions within
which they work.
The modern abhorrence of discretion as the basis of ethical error
points in precisely the wrong direction: the suspicion of discretion leads
to an instinct towards rule-following that creates moral myopia; to a
misapprehension of what the task of judging truly requires; to a race to
the ethical bottom that praises regulation over aspiration; and to a denial
of the person's choice and therefore also of the person himself. Discretion
does not only mean a free reign of options; discretion also means prudence
(judgment or practical wisdom). Discretion in this latter sense calls upon
and challenges the subject to decide, to rise to her ethical best. Instead
of viewing the person as simply a vehicle for applying the correct rule,
it places the person at- the centre of ethical deliberation and choice. In a
perfect world, rules would be unnecessary for those who are virtuous.
The project of seeking virtue requires the DoJ lawyer to look to others
for ethical direction, mentorship, insight and support. As much as they
must look to the revised statutes of Canada in fulfilling their roles as
advocates, DoJ lawyers must also look to the exemplary people around
them for guidance. If they look to the right people, DoJ lawyers will see
the spirit of service to the nation thriving in the practices of those who
breathe life into our living government.

177. Forsey, supra note I at 49.
178. Roderick A. Macdonald, "Exercising Judgement / La facultd de discernement" [unpublished
speaking notes on file with author].

